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Summary findings
Commodities are often stored during periods in which  world level, or more narrowly defined as the New York
storage returns a negative price. Further, during periods  Commodities Exchange or the London Metal Exchange.
of "backwardation," the expected revenue from holding  Larson argues that although inventories may provide a
inventories will be negative.  Kaldor cost-reducing convenience yield, inventories also
Since the  1930s, the negative price of storage has been  have value because of uncertainty. just  as the price of a
attributed  to an offsetting "convenience yield." Kaldor,  call option contains a premium based on price variability
Working, and later Brennan argued that inventories are a  so the shadow price of inventories contains a dispersion
nece-ssary  adjunct to business and that increasing  premium associated with the unplanned component  of
inventories from some minimal level reduces overall  inventories.
costs. This theory has always been criticized by  Larson derives a generalized price-arbitrage condition
proponents  of cost-of-carry models, who argue that a  in which either a Kaldor-convenience and/or a dispersion
negative price for stor2 e creates arbitrage opportunities.  premium may justify inventory holding even during an
Proponents of the cost-of-carry model have asserted that  expected price fall. He uses monthly observations of U.S
storage will occur only with positive returns. They offer  producer inventories to estimate the parameters of the
a set of price-arbitrage conditions that associate negative  price-arbitrage condition.  The estimates and simulations
returns with stockouts. Still, stockouts are rare in  he presents are ambiguoLs with regard to the existence
commodity markets, and storage appears to take place  of a Kaldor-convenience but strongly support the notion
during periods of "backwardation"  in apparent violation  of a dispersion premium for copper. And although the
of the price-arbitrage conditions.  averagt value of such a premium is low, the value of the
For copper, inventories have always been available to  premium increases rapidly during periods when
the market regardless ot the price of storage. This is true  inventories are scarce.
whether the market is broadly defined at the U.S. or
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I,.1.0 Introduction
The purpose  of this paper is to explain producer-held  inventories  of refined copper
durirg an anticipated  fall in prices. Commodities  are often stored during periods in which
storage returns a negative  price -- that is, when the expected  price change  (as indicated  by
futures prices)  does not cover  the time-value  of money  plus storage  expenses. In fact, during
periods of backwardation  (when  the settlement  price for a near-by  future contract  is greater
than the price for contracts  with more  distant settlement  dates),  the anticipated  revenue  from
holding inventories  will be negative. In the case of copper, inventories  have always been
available to the market regardless  of the price of storage. This is true whether  the market
is broadly defined at the US or world level, or more narrowly defined as the New York
Commodities  Exchange,  or the London  Metal Exchange. Since  the 1930s,  the negative  price
of storage  has been  attributed  to an off-setting  "convenience  yield". Kaldor  (1939),  Working
(1948)  and, later, Brennan  (1958)  argued  that inventories  are a necessary  adjunct  to carrying
out business  and, at some minimal  level, increasing  inventories  reduces  overall costs. This
theory has always been criticized  by proponents  of cost-of-carry  models,  who argue that a
negative price for storage creates arbitrage opportunities. More recently, Williams and
Wright (1991) have correctly  argued  that "convenience  yields"  have not been derived from
a formal optimization  model.  Proponents of the cost-of-carry  model have asserted that
storage will occur only with positive  returns and offer a set of price-arbitrage  conditions.
Williams  and Wright have augmented  the cost-of-carry  argument  by stressing  the effects of
stock-outs  on price. Nonetheless,  Williams  and Wright (1991, p.140) note there have been
no stock-outs in the Chicago wheat markets during the last 120 years, and concede that
storage appears  to take place duiring  periods of backwardation,  in apparent  violation  of the
Iprice-arbitrage  conditions.
This paper argues that while inventories may provide a  Kaldor cost-reducing
convenience  yield, inventories  also have value because  of uncer.ainty. Just as the price of
a call option  contains  a premium based on price variability,  the shadow  price of inventories
conte;ns a dispersion  premium  associated  with the unplanned  component  of inventories. A
goneralized  price-arbitrage  condition  is derived  in which  either a Kaldor-convenience  and/or
a dispersion premium may justify inventory-holding  even during an expected price fall.
Monthly  observations  of US producer  inventories  are used to estimate  the parameters  of the
price-arbitrage  condition. The estimation  and simulations  presented  provide little evidence
for supporting  or dismissing  the existence  of a Kaldor-convenience,  but strongly  support the
notion of a dispersion premium for copper.  Further, while the average value of such a
premium is low, the value of the premium increases rapidly during periods in  which
inventories  are scarce.
Following this introduction,  the remainder  of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 reviews the behavior  of prices for the spot and futures markets  in refined copper
and discusses  backwardation  and a negative  price for storage  in the context of the economic
literature. In this section, the arguments  of Working,  Brennan,  Keynes,  and Williams and
Wright are more fully  explained. Section  3 develops  the formal model  of inventory-holding
in terms of a stochastic-control  problem  for the ending-value  of inventories. The generalized
price-arbitrage  conditions  are derived  from the optimization  problem's  first-order  conditions.
Section 4 contains a description of the data and an estimation of the parameters  of the
generalized  price-arbitrage  condition. Section 5 concludes.
22.0 Reflned Copper Prices and the Negative Price of Storage
Refining copper is a risky business  and refined copper prices are characterized  by volatile
price movements. Price swings can be large and sudden while low price levels can linger
persistently. The movement  in refined  coppek  is especially  significant  given the small  profits
obtained through  refining  -- typically  6 to 10 per cent of the final cost of refined  electrolytic
copper  (Brook Hunt & Associates,  1986). Since  the refiner  must buy scrap or blister copper,
the spread  between  the two prices  contains  the implicit  fee for processing  copper  (Figure  2.1).
Yet, because of the time it takes to  process the copper, rapid price movements can
dramatically  inflate  profits  or generate  losses  even  when  the spread  between  inputs  and output
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Figure 2.1: Copper prices, August 1978  to December 1989.
3price remains  constant. There are several options available  to the refiner. He can contract
the processing  services  directly,  charging  a fee but returning  the refined  copper  to the original
owner of the blister or scMp  copper (tolling);  he can implicitly  make the same arrangement
by buying spot in the blister or scrap market  and simultaneously  selling (shorting)  a futures
contract in New York or London;  he can contract  with a semifabricator  for future delivery
while buying in the spot market, etc.
The value of finished  inventories  held by refiners is subject to the same volatility.
Gains or losses genemted  by wide swings in the value of held inventories  may affect the
firm's  profitability  more  greatly than  returns  from flows  (production  and sales). Options  open
to the refiner include  rcducing  inventories  to near-zero  levels  or contracting  to sell inventories
either explicitly, or implicitly  through the futures market. In addition,  even when forward
contracts have been writLan,  further revenue can be generated by implicitly "lending"
inventories. The mechanics  of such an arrangement  are discussed  later; however  the practice
has obvious and certain positive returns during periods of market backwardation.
Markets for refined  copper and other metals are somewhat  distinctive  in their proclivity  for
backwardation  in futures pricing. Backwardation  occurs when the price of futures contracts
with a more distant  delivery date are discounted  with respect to near-by  contracts. A more
common  and more general condition  is when inventories  are held at less-than-full  carrying
charges,  which Working  (1949)  termed a negative price for storage.  A negative  price for
storage occurs when the difference  between the expected rate of change in the price fcr
immediate delivery and full carrying costs (interest, insurance, warehousing fees, and
spoilage)  is negative. As a practical  matter,  a situation in which the difference  between  the
price for near-by  and more  distant futures  prices  falls below full carrying  charges  is taken as
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Figure 2.2: Future price profile for high-grade  copper.
a negative  price for storage. Backward  markets  necessarily  carry  a negative  price fo: storage
since revenues  from et rage are negative.
Figure 2.2 gives the profile of closing future prices on high-grade  copper for two
separate  dates in 1991. From July I to September  23 the entire price curve rose, while the
futures  market remained  in backwardation.  While the situation  depicted  in Figure 2.2 cannot
be characterized  as "normal",  it is not unique  for copper. From 1980  to 1989  the last-day-of-
the-month  spreads on COMEX  copper futures were backward  29 times -- or roughly 24%
of the time.  A negative price for storage  has been even more common. Jeffrey Williams
(1986) writes:
In nine of the ten years from  1974 through 1983 at least some of the spreads' in
copperfailed  to displayfully  carrying charges, sometimes, as in 1974 and 1980,
by  a  considerable  margin.  That any  spreads  in  copper  were less  than full
'A spread,  in this  context,  is the  price  of a futures  contract  with  a more  distant  delivery  date  minus
the price  of a futures  contract  with  an earlier  delivery  date.
5carrying charges is surprising in itself  Because copper is a natural resource,
having little seasonality in  production or demand, and large reserves of scrap, the
presumption  would be strong that i:s price should Increase to cover interest ana
storage  costs, as presumed  in most models of natural resources.
Fama and French (1988),  looking  at daily interest-compensated  spreads  between  spot and 3-
month,  6-month,  and 12-month  forwaid  copper  contracts  on the LME  between  1972  and 1983
reported negative  average spreads  for copper.
The general failure of the spreads  in futures prices to cover full carrying  charges  is
well known to the literature.  Holbrook Working noted the phenomenon in 1934, and
Nicholas Kaldor wrote about a "convenience  yield" to stocks in 1939. In 1948, Working
provided a theory on "inverse  carrying charges" which included a supply of storage at a
negative price:
Another important condition is thatfor  most of the potential suppliers of storage,
the costs are joint;  the owners  of large storage facilities  are  mostly engaged
either in merchandising or in processing, and maintain storage faciliti2s largely
as a necessary adjunct to their merchandising or processi;.g business.  And not
only are the facilities  an adjunct; the exercise of the storing function itself is a
necessary adjunct to the merchandising or processing business.  Consequently,
the direct costs of storing over some specified period as well as the indirect costs
may be charged against the associated business which remains profitable, and so
also may what appear as direct losses on the storage operation itself.  For any
such potential supplier of storage, stocks of a commodity below some fairly  well
recognized level carry what Kaldor has aptly called a convenience yield.  This
convenience yield may offjet what appears as a fairly  large loss from  exercise of
the storage function  itself
The concept of a convenience  yield has become a popular  and enduring  part of the
literature  on inventory  behavior. (See Howell,  1956;  Brennan,  1958;  Telser, 1958;  Weymar,
1974; Gray and Peck 1981, Thompson,  1986;  Williams, 1986; Tilley and Campbell, 1988;
Thurman,  1988;  Fama and French, 1988;  and Gibson  and Schwarz,  1990.) However,  as with
many economic  terms, there is a conflict in the literature over its definition. Kaldor and
Working, for example, apply convenience  yield to mean an implicit return to holders of
6inventories  whose  market value  equals  the difference  between  futures price spreau;s  and full
carrying  costs. The value  to the  holder  derives  from  jointness  between  inventory  holding  and
related merchandising  or processing. More recently,  "the" convenience  yield, has taken %
more  operational  definition,  coming  to mean  the  evaluation  itself or, more  precisely,  the array
of spreads between futures prices adjusted for carrying costs.  Often warehouse  fees and
transaction  costs are ignored  so that carrying charges  are exclusively  composed  of interest
charges. (See, for example,  Fama  and French, 1988). in such a case, the convenience  yiold
is an empirical  entity,  constantly  changing  much like a tond yield curve. In this paper,  I will
retain the definition given by Kaldor and Working.  A  similar idea, in  keeping with
Working's definiti-:. of convenience,  is that inventories are essential to production and
therefore inventory-holding  cf inputs is joint with production  as well as with marketing.
Ramey (1989) used such an argur..ent  to justify inclusion  of inventory  levels in modeling
production  technology.
Jeffrey WVilliarnr  and Brian Wright (Wright and Williams, 1989; Williams and
Wright, 1991) have been especially critical of literature concerning a convenience  yield.
Williams and Wright justifiably argue that convenience  yields are not derived from "first
principles" (i.e. optimization  conditions). 2 They go on to argue that the "observation  of
storage under backwardation  is an aggregation  phenomenon"  and that "a spread  below full
carrying charges can emerge only when there is no storage of that commodity....  Profit-
maximizing  storage  takes  place only at full carrying  charges,  properly  calculated." 3 (Wright
2Ramey  is an exception  not noted  by Williams  and Wright.
'Williams  (1986)  credits  Higinbotham  (1976)  with  suggesting  that  the  paradoxes  of spreads  result
from misleading  averaging.
7and Williams,  pp. 3-4). By including  the costs of transporting  inventories  from one location
to another,  or the costs of transforming  one close substitute  to the relevant  commodity  (say
dirty wheat to clean wheat),  Wright  and Williams  argue,  the convenience  yield disappears.
Backwardation  in futures markets arises when the probability  of a stock-out for the near
period  is greater than for a later period. 4 In William. and Wright (1991,  p. 140)  they soften
their stance, stating that "Empirically  it does seem that storage takes place when the spot
spread is in backwardation,  if for no other evidence  than the disquieting  fact that stock-outs
are never observed." At the same time, in their simulation  model, they maintain  a set of
price-arbitrage  conditions  that precludes  storage  at less-than-full  carrying charges.
Since inventories  are often reported aggregated  over location,  if not over type and
grade of commodity  as well,  it is difficult  to test the Wright and Williams  assertion  in many
instances. However, the inventory-holding  behavior  of certified warehouse  inventories of
refined copper provides a clear counter-example  of the type which Williams and Wright
recognized  in their 1991 statement. At numerous  times throughout  their history, both the
LME and the COMEX  have reported  abundant  supplies  of certified  warehouse  stocks while
simultaneously  reporting  backwardation  in futures  pricing. The added value of certification
is that certified inventories can be used to  fulfill commitments resulting from futures
contracts.  Should a holder of an open short futures contract in copper decide to deliver
copper rather than close his position,  he need only transfer  a receipt for inventories  held in
any certified warehouse.  No transportation  or transformation  is involved.  Table 2.1
reproduces  data reported  by Williams (1986) on copper spreads  on a single day in January
4Bresnahan  and Suslow  (1986)  make  a similar  argument  specificaUy  in the case  of copper  and
backwardation  in the Lordon  Metal  Exchange.
8cver a ten-year  period  and supplements  it with data on inventory  levels. For the observations
reported,  it was more common  than not for refined  copper  inventory  to be held at a negative
price, that is, below full carrying costs.  At no time did a "stock-out"  occur, although
inventories  were low in January 1974. At the same  time, however,  it is difficult  to argue  that
effective stock-outs  occurred in 1979 and 1980 but did not in 1975 and 1976. And copper
is not the only commodity  to retain certified stocks  in backward  markets. Williams  (1986)
notes that, despite the fact that there is no reason why elevators cannot be completely
emptied,  certified  wheat and soybean  stocks,  precisely  those eligible for delivery on futures
contracts,  have never  fallen to zero. For wheat  in Chicago,  this includes  s period  of over 120
years.5
While Williams  and Wright recognize  the tension between  the cost-of-carry  model
and observed  periods of negative  storage  with positive  inventory  levels, a negative  price for
storage is routinely excluded from the possible range of solutions in the literature on
commodity  policy  issues. The general  inter-temporal  arbitrage  conditions  are often  given as:
VWith  regard  to the 1973  soybean  crop,  Williams  writes  (pp.  *6-37):
In 1973, the cost of keepina  the more than 3 million  bushels in store in Chicago  was more than
$2.1 million. This expense  was even larger  nationwide. The  total stock  of old-crop  soybeans  as
of I September  1973  was 60 million  bushels,  the smallest  carryover  of the decade  (although  it was
still some  4% of the crop being then  harvested.) As of I August 1973,  the spread  between  the spot
price and the Augustfutures  contract,  on which  deliveries  were eligible  until  the end of the month,
was -$1.30  per bushel. This  suggests  that the holders  of those  60 million  bushels  paid on the order
of $78 million,  quite apartfrom physical  storage  costs,  for the privilege  of keeping them in store
that one extra month.
9Table 2.1: Spreads.  stocks, and producion of refined copper  in the United  States  on the first business  day of January. 1974-1983.
Prisd  of spread  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983
iaauaay-March  4.60  .45  .40  .40  .40  .75  1.45  1.30  .80  .60
march-may  -1.40  .55  .50  .45  .50  .75  .15  1.30  .85  .55
May-July  -1.00  .60  .45  .45  .50  .70  .10  .95  .85  .55
July,Sepem*ber  -.60  .60  .45  .45  .45  .55  .15  .85  .85  .60
Seplomber-Decembaer  -.60  .65  .35  .45  .45  .45  .15  .80  .80  .70
Price  of December
conract  80.60  58.50  59.60  67.40  54.50  75.30  112.70  99.40  33.40  75.75
Spreads  afker  removal  of carrying  charges
janry-Maub  -5.20  .00  .00  .00  -.05  .00  .00  .00  -.10  .00
March-May  -2.10  .00  .00  .00  -.05  .00  -1.30  .00  -.10  -.05
May-July  -1.65  .00  .00  .00  -.05  -.05  -1.30  -.20  -.10  -.0S
July-Sepsember  -1.20  .00  .00  -.05  -.05  -.25  -1.25  -.30  -.10  -.05
Sephmbe-December  -1.15  .00  -.05  -.05  -.05  -.35  -1.20  -.40  -.15  .00
Stcks  and mventory  of refined copper  expresaed  m short tous
Comex  Warehouse  stocks  5,873  43,214  100,102  200,953  184,390  179,572  98,856  179,770  186,920  272,999
Total  US stos  49,098  194,851  360,700  473,800  471,100  367,900  186,300  253,000  338,600  484,500
US production  in Januay  157,700  146,000  130,300  140,900  129,000  135,600  161,000  133,500  117,500  97,300
Note: Spreds in copper  ae  based  on the closing  prices  as of the first business  day in January  and are expressed  m cenls  per pound  per month,  taken  from Wllias
(1986).  Inventory  vahles  corresponig  to January  are December  3 t ;evels. Inventory  and producton  da  were compiled  from various  issues  of Meal Slatdcs.
10p,  s p,',/(l  r)  - k t-  2 0  (1.1)
pt  > pe,'11(l  +r)  - k-  zt  - °-
where z  is inventory  level, p  is price, r  is a discount  rate, k is a constant positive  per unit
storage  cost, and a superscript  c denotes  expectations.  Recent  examples  include  Miranda  and
Helmberger  (1988) and Glauber, Helmberger,  and Miranda  (1989).
Another  argument,
related to  a  negative price
for  storage,  is  Keynes's
(1931)  notion  of  normal
backwardation.  Keynes
argued  that  commodity  I  ,=  :  =
markets  could  remain
backward in equilibrium (at  _
Con~e  Corm
constant  price expectations),  NO  I
implying negative reveizue
for storage, because of the  Figure 2.3: Futures prices over time with constant future
price expectations.
way  in  which  risk  is
transferred from commodity producers, who are naturally long in  the commodity, to
speculators. Hedging  producers  take a short position  in the market (to offset their naurally
long positions)  while  speculators  take the opposite  position. Keynes  argued  that speculators
would decline taking an opposing long position  unless the expected rate-of-retum  on long
positions exceeded  the riskless rate-of-return. In order for this to be the case, the expectd
rate-of-return  on the futures position  would  have to be less than the expected  spot price and
11rise as the contract  matured;  that is, futures prices  would have to be discounted  to expected
prices. Keynes  called this price-time  relationship  normal  backwardation.  (See Figure 2.3.)
Conversely,  if hedgers are, on net, long in futures contracts,  then speculators  would require
a higher-than-riskless  rate of return on short positions.  In this instance, the futures price
would have to contain a premium over the expected  price, which declines as the contract
matures. Keynes referred  to this relationship  as normal  contango. Despite its implications
of a negative price for storage, Keynes's  theory of normal backwardation  has little to say
about  inventories  and arbitrage  possibilities. This omission  has formed  the basis of criticism
by cost-of-carry  proponents  (see, for example,  Figlewski, 1986).
Regardless  of the validity of Keynes's arguments,  the theory set off a number of
empirical studies aimed at verifying  the presence  of a downward  bias in futures (that is, a
tendercy for the price of a futures contract to "rise up" to expected price levels as the
contract  approaches  maturity). Houthakker  (1957),  using  trade statistics  on corn and wheat,
concluded that naive small traders could benefit by blindly following a long-side trade
position. Tessler  (1958, 1960)  found no evidence  of normal  backwardation.  Cootner  (1960,
1967)  then presented  several  cases in support  of normal backwardation,  while Dusak  (1973),
using a portfolio approach,  noted that even gains from arbitrating backward  markets were
small  when compared  to investments  in the stock market  which carried similar  levels  of risk.
Two more recent studies, however, have emerged  which provide support for Houthakker's
original findings. In the first, Carter,  Rausser,  and Schmitz  (1983)  modify  Dusak's  portfolio
approach  to allow for systematic  risk and found non-zero  estimates  of systematic  risk for
most of the speculative return series examined.  More recently, using non-parametric
techniques,  Eric Chang (1990) found  statistical  support  for normal backwardation  in a study
12based on wheat, com, and soybean futures.  In studies relating directly to the market tor
metals, Hsieh and Kulatilaka  (1982), using monthly  data on LME forward contracts from
January 1970 to September  1980,  reported  average risk premia of 2.8% for copper, 17%  for
tin, 12.7% for zinc, and 16% for lead.  In a later study, MacDonald and Taylor (1989)
reported evidence  for a "time-varying  premium"  in the forward prices for tin and zinc.
While  cditicisms of  Keynes's theory of  normal backwardation and  Kaldores
convenience  yield remain valid, the empirical  studies offered in their support are often at
odds with the simple cost-of-carry  price-arbitrage  conditions  given in 2.1.
When inventories  are being held at less than full carrying  charges  or when the price
on futures contracts is below expected prices, incentives are created to inter-temporally
arbitrage  the market  under the  cost-of-carry  model. The  most obvious  course of acdon  would
be for holders  of inventories  to reduce  their costs  by selling  immediately  into  the spot market,
bringing near-prices down relative to more distant delivery dates.  Such inter-temporal
arbitrating  should  continue  until the expected  returns to arbitrage  equal the expected  returns
to inventory  holding,  or a "stock-out"  occurs,  when  inventories  are reduced  to some near-zero
minimum  level.
Similar arbitrage opportunities are available even when inventories have been
contracted  for future  delivery. For example,  consider  a holder  of inventories  (say  a producer)
who has sold copper  forward  for delivery  in 60 days. Regardless  of the terms of the forward
contract,  the seller can generate  revenue  in a backward  market,  or reduce  holding  costs when
storage  returns a negative  price, by "lending"  inventories  to the market.
Although  direct loan markets  are currently  relatively rare for commodities,  they do
exist for uranium, and a brokerage  firm, the Nuclear Exchange Corporation  (NUEXCO),
13exists to facilitate  such ioans. In addition,  there are active explicit loan markets  for equity
shares  on many  stock exchanges. 6 Williams  (1986)  documents  an active  loan  market  in grain
warehouse receipts in the United  States in the 1860s.
While no explicit loan market exists for refined copper, loan transactions  can be
accomplished  in an equivalent  manner  using  futures and spot markets,  obviating  the need for
an explicit market. Once the decision  has been  made to hold inventories  for a span  covering
the delivery  date of at least one futures contract,  lending  inventories  can be accomplished  in
a  straightforward  manner.  Holders of inventories can sell into the spot market while
simultaneously  contracting  to repurchase  the copper (by purchasing  a futures contract)  at a
future date for a fixed price. In a backward  market,  this sum will be positive  and constitutes
a positive interest payment  on an implicit  copper loan. The effect on the copper market is
to increase supplies available for immediate  delivery and increase the demand for future
deliveries,  arbitrating  the backwardation.  It should be noted  that not only does the supplier
of inventories  receive a payment,  but he also eliminates  the need to store. As a result,  even
when the futures market does not exhibit backwardation  but does return a negative  price for
storage, a holder of inventories can reduce his costs by lending supplies to the market.
Therefore, in  cost-of-carry models, a  negative price for  storage generates arbitrage
opportunities  as well,  encouraging  supplies  to be freed from inventories.' As with the direct
6The  London  Exchange  provides  the most  straight-forward  example.  In London  the  exchange
settles  every  fortnight  rather  than  every  day as in New  York. Buyers  of stocks  have  contracted  to
receive  the  stocks  on  a particular  day,  but,  if compensated,  may  agree  to delay  taking  delivery  of the
stock. If there is sufficient  pressure  for immediate  delivery,  the person  agreeing  to postpone  a
contracted  delivery  may  receive  either  a concessionary  rate  on margin  loans  or a fee  from  the  seller.
The  fee is called  a "backwardation"  and is equivalent  to interest  on a loan  of deliverable  stock.
7The  flip-side  of lending  is,  of course,  borrowing.  Because  of the  !wo-step  nature  of the  implicit
loan  procedure  given  above,  first selling  near  while  buying  long,  each  "lender"  need  not correspond
with  a single  borrower.  For  example  a fabricator  may  be purchasing  the  copper  from  the  spot  market
14inter-temporal arbitrage, holders of inventories can be expected to  lend into markets
exhibiting backwardation  or negative storage prices until the expected return on lending
equals the expected  return on holding  inventories.
The implicit  returns  to loans from inventories  of refined  copper  were calculated  from
futures price spreads for September  24, 1991 and are given in Table 2.2.  The returns are
probably  underestimated,  as warehouse  fees, which  would  increase  the returns  to lending,  and
transaction  costs, which would decrease  the returns slightly,  have been omitted. Recalling
that total profits from refining may equal less than 10% of the price of refined copper, the
incentives  to lend are significant. Put another way, the price of borrowing inventories  is
high.
In the following section, it is argued that a convex shadow  price for inventories,
combined  with uncertain  demand,  gives rise to a dispersion  premium  for inventories. When
inventories  are low,  the effect of a higher-than-expected  sales level will  have a greater  effect
on price than when inventories  are more plentiful. In addition,  when inventories  are low, the
range of possible price outcomes  become more skewed  toward higher prices. By carrying
inventories  into the period,  the producer  has the option  of taking advantage  of higher  prices,
should  they materialize,  without  increasing  production  and incurring  increasingly  expensive
marginal  costs. Because  of the asymmetry,  the drop in the value of the carried inventories,
when sales are  correspondingly  lower-than-expected,  is not as severe. This relationship  gives
rise to a  generalization  of the price-arbitrage  conditions in which it is rational to hold
while  a toller  may  be locking  in a future  sales price  for refined  copper. However,  if desired,  the
mechanism  is readily  available  for a refiner  to borrow  inventories  which  are  replenished  from  future
production.  This mechanism  allows  individual  firms  to hold  a negative  inventory  of copper,  even
though  stocks  must  be non-negative  in the  aggregate.
15inventories in the face of expected price declines.
In its emphasis  on nonlinearities,  the model  is similar to Gardner's  (1979) model  of
optimal grain storage. Gardner used recursive  programming  techniques  to demonstrate  that
non-linearites in the sh&tdow  price for inventories  can result, in part, from nonlinearities  in
Table 2.2: Implicit  interest  from lending  refined  copper  stock using  September  24, 1991  cloing COMEX  pos
for refined  copper.
Delivery  Sottlement
Date  Price  1-month  2-months  3-months
-------------------  cents per pound  ------
(% annualized  return)
September  '91  110.25  3.03  4.94  6.69
(33.0)  (26.9)  (23.9)
October  107.75  1.92  3.68  5.42
(21.4)  (20.5)  (20.1)
November  106.35  1.77  3.52  4.56
(19.9)  (19.9)  (17.2)
Decmber  105.10  1.76  2.81  4.10
(20.1)  (16.0)  (15.6)
January  '92  103.85  1.06  2.35  3.44
(12.3)  (13.6)  (13.2)
February  103.30  1.30  2.40  3.48
(15.1)  (13.9)  (13.5)
March  102.50  1.10  2.19  3.13
(12.9)  (12.8)  (12.2)
April  101.90  1.10  2.04  2.97
(13.0)  (12.0)  (11.7)
May  101.30  0.94  1.88  2.81
(I11.  1)  (I11.  1)  (I11.  1)
June  100.85  0.94  1.88  2.36
(11.2)  (11.2)  (9-4!
July  100.40  0.94  1.43
(11.2)  (8.5)
August  99.95  0.49
(5.9)
September  99.95
Note: Implicit  interest calculated  on an annualized  5.98%  discount  rate where:
interest  = pf(t)  - p'(t+n)em,  n = 1,2,3
and where p' represent  settlement  prices for futurs  contracts  deliverable  at t and t+n.
16the underlying  objective  function. Since  Gardner's  topic was the optimal  storage of grains,
the primary source of asymmetry  was the fact that supplies of grairn  can be withheld for
future  consumption  while a symmetric  transfer  from the future to tlie present is impossible.
Nonetheless,  Gardner  also showed  that nonlinearities  in demand,  for example,  would affect
the valuation  of the shadow  prices as well.
As will be seen later, the convex relationship between price and inventories is
suggested by simply plotting the two series and is a standard  feature throughout  a long
history of economic  literature. It is
often stated  as a stylized fact that the  C
marginal  value  of inventory  increases
with scarcity,  declining  in a nonlinear !
manner to zero as inventory levels  0  o  Nz
z  >~~~~  le~vol  of inventories
increase. The marginally  high value  l  of nenoe
of  inventories  at  low  levels  of  lnt
physical  stocks  is usually  ascribed  to
convenience  and  is  often  the  Figure 2.4: The marginal  cost-of-storage  function.
departure  point  in textbooks  and applied  studies  (for example,  Stein, 1987;  Fama  and French,
1988;  Gibson  and Schwartz,  1990). Conversely,  when  holders  of inventories  appear  willing
to retain inventories  despite  arbitrage  opportunities,  as in backward  markets  or other markets
with a negative  price for storage,  the holders are presumed  to receive  a higher "convenience
yield" as compensation. Working  (1948) and Brennan  (1958)  provide  a number of reasons
why the value of inventories  above  carrying  charges  might rise to very high values  at scarce
levels and fall to zero at sufficiently  high stock levels. Working  argues  primarily  that stocks
17are often an adjunct of business and provide convenience and cost savings through a
reduction  in restocking  costs and an ability  to quickly  meet orders. As stock levels increase,
the marginal  contribution  of additional  stocks goes to zero. As inventories  build, storage
facilities reach capacity levels and marginal  storage  becomes  increasingly  expensive.
Generally,  the marginal  cost-of-storage  function  is depicted  as shown in Figure  2.4,
where z' marks the inflection point.  However, in addition to the notion of convenience,
Working also offered some arguments  based on expectations  and probability,  noting that
"Merchants who deal in  goods that are  subject to  whims of fashion, or to  sudden
obsolescence  for other reasons,  must lay in stocks and carry them in expectation  that some
part of the stocks will have to be sold at a heavy loss." Additionally,  he points out that as
stocks become low the probability  of a "squeeze"  in the futures market increases. Brennan
also argues  that the "convenience  yield"  derives  primarily  from fewer delays  and lower costs
(because  of less frequent  ordering  and stocking)  in delivering  goods  to consumers. However,
Brennan  also discusses  what he calls a "risk-aversion  factor",  noting  that the larger the level
of inventories,  the greater the effect of a price change and the revaluation  of held stocks.
In the next section a formal model is developed to show that convex inventory-
shadow  prices for copper  can arise regardless  of whether  inventories  are cost-reducing. The
model does allow for a cost-reducing  Kaldor-convenience  yield as well. A generalized  set
of price-arbitrage  conditions  is then derived  from the first-order  conditions  of the model. The
model  is then used to test r  ipirically  for convexity  in the shadow  price of inventories  which
gives rise to an estimatable  dispersion  premium. The existence  of a cost-reducing  effect for
inventories  is also examined.
183.0 The Optmizaton ModW  and the Price-Arbitrage  Condition
In this  section, the formal model is summarized from the detailed derivation
contained  in Annex 1. A generalized  price-arbitrage  condition  is derived  from the first-order
conditions  of the optimization  problem  which is consistent  with inventory-holding  during an
anticipated  price fall.  The copper-refining  problem is characterized  as a continuous  two-
cycle problem with uncertain  future demand. In the current period, the producer knows  the
current sales price.  By deciding how much to produce and sell, he determines  how much
inventory  he will bring into the next period.  The expected  marginal value, or the shadow
price, of the inventory in the next period is not known, but contains a stochastic element
since demand is uncertain. The effects of random  demand shocks  on the shadow  price of
inventories  may be asymmetric  -- that is, a positive random shock may increase  prices by
more than an equally sized negative  random shock.  In such a case, the shadow price of
inventory  will carry a dispersion  premium so th;t the shadow  price of inventories  increases
with the variance  of the stochastic  component  of sales. Such a premium  is analogous  to the
volatility  premium in an options  price and can result in positive inventory  levels even when
price declines  are expected.
The solution to the copper refiners profit maximization  problem can be found by
solving the Hamiltonian:
Max,,,H a [ps - C(y,z)]e  *  + A(y-s)  (3.1)
where p  is the sales price; s  is the sales level; C is a joint cost function  for storage and
production  where z is level of inventories  and y is the production  level; r  is the discount-
rate.  A is the change in profit due to a marginal change in the inventory level, or the
19shadow  price  of inventories.  The producer  maximizes  profits  by setting  the marginal  cost
of production  and the narginal  revenue  of sales  equal  to the value  of a marginal  change  in
the level  of inventories  at the end of the  period.
Prices  are known  in the current  period,  and  inventory  levels  are deternined  once
sales and  production  levels  are decided,  but the ending  value  of inventories  is not knowr.
exactly. Rather,  the value  of stocks,  and  the shadow  price  of inventories,  X, are based  on
expectations  about  future  prices,  production,  and  sales.
When  sales contain  a random  element,  inventory  levels  will also be stochastic  and
changes  in inventories  will contain  a planned  and unplanoed  component.  The difference
between  planned  and  actual  inventories  will be the difference  between  expected  and actual
production  minus  sales.  For the momnent,  assu,ne  that the change  in inventories  can be
expressed  as the following  process:
;z;_z  ,s  Et [y,-s,  l  ]  +  (3.2)
where  E  has an expected  value  of zero and a variance  a2.  Rewriting  the constraint  on
inventories  in continuous-time  notation,  the value  of ending  inventories  at time  t,  is the
solution  to the following  infinite-horizon  problem:
e"'V(z,l)  * Max, EF{[ps  - C(yz)]t.  d  = E(y-)d  +  .)
The term  dv  m u(t)dt 112 is a Wiener  process,  where  u(t) - N(O,  1).
The  solution  to the  problem  makes  use of stochastic  calculus,  the  mechanics  of which
are somewhat  tedius  and  have  been  relegated  to Annex  1. However  the relevant  first-order
conditions  can be summarized  graphically.  The producer  solves  for planned  production,
20sales and inventories  by setting  erpected marginal  costs equal to expected  price equal  to the
shadow  price of inventories, V; - which is itself an expected  value.  Because  the producer
has the option  of either producing  more oL  storing less, he must solve on two margins. This
is shown graphically in Figure 3.1 where marginal costs we drawn convex in y and the
shadow  price of inventories  is drawn convex  in z.  Whir. tS  ere is an increase  in the expected
price, inventories are reduced until the shadow price is equal to the new expected  price
Elpj, V  E[p]. V
z  zi
-mz  al cost
i  Io 
zl  Z  iniventories  y  y  productionl
Figure  3.1: The effect  of an increase  in price  on inxentories  and  production.
freeing  inventories  for current  consumption.  At the  same  time,  planned  pioduction  increases
and expecte,d  marginal  costs  increase  until  marginal  cost  equals  expected  price.
The first-order  conditions  can  be manipulated  to express  the optimization  conditons
in terms  of expected  price:
21E[dp/dt]  = rE(p]  + E[Ct] - 2  V0 2 ,  for z,s,y  > 0  (3.4)
Equation  3.11 is a generalization  of price-arbitrage  conditions  given in cost-of-carry  models
such as Williams  and Wright  (1991, p. 27). The arbitrage  condition  states  that the expected
change  in price will be equal to rE[p] -- interest  on investing  the money  elsewhere  -- plusC,
- the costs of physical storage and any amenity  from storage  -- minus lV_2  If Va  is
positive, then this last term constitutes a  dispersion premium that increases with the
variability of the stochastic  component  of inventories  o2. The last two components  of 3.4
have importart implications  for holding inventories in the face of less-than-full  carrying
charges.  According  to the condition, it still may be optimal  to hold inventories  when the
market is in backwardation  --  E[dp/dt] < 0  - if  inventories provide a  cost-reducing
Kaldor-convenience  (that is, if Cz is sufficiently  negative)  and/or the dispersion premium,
5V=C2, is sufficiently  positive. The two components  are not mutually  dependent. Kaldor-
convenience  alone can potentially  explain inventory-holding  in backward  markets, as can a
dispersion premium.  When V.  =  0  and C. is positive, 3.4 reduces to the cost-of-carry
price-arbitrage  condition.
For the cost-of-carry  model, no inventories  are held when the sum of the current
price plus a constant physical storage cost is greater than the expected discounted  future
price.  Putting  this constraint  into a continuous-time  counter-part:
E [/dpt  - rp +k,  fir  z >0.  (3.5)
The two arbitrage conditions  differ in two respects.  In 3.12, storage costs are
treated as a constant  positive  marginal  cost, and separate from other activities  such as sales
or production.  Cost-of-carry  models are usually based on the activities of professional
22speculators  who presumably  receive no convenience  from holding inventories  and do not
participate  in production. Generally,  however, there is nothing  fundamental  to the derivation
of cost-of-carry models which requires fixed marginal storage costs and the marginal
storage-cost  function  could be written in a more flexible  manner.  The second difference
between the two arbitrage conditions is the presence of a  dispersion premium in the
generalized  price-arbitrage  conditions. This comes  from treating  the value  of the inventories
as stochastic.  Cost-of-carry  models use expected prices (or futures prices representing
expected  prices)  but do not treat the price changes  themselves  as a stochastic  process. This
differs from option-pricing  models  where the variance  of the underlying  commodity  price
enters explicitly  into the evaluation  of the option.
The dispersion premium,  2 V  o2, can be interpreted as the expected difference
between the stochastic  and deterministic  value of inventories. To see this, start with the
marginal-value  function of  inventories defined in  terms of a  deterministic component
(planned  inventories)  plus a random  element, and calculate  a Taylor-series  approximation:
V(Zd+E)  aVz)  +  V4E  + ! V6e
2 +  I V,e  (3.6) zz  2  6  =  E
When  e has  an  expected value  of  zero,  and  is  symmetrically distributed, where
E[e] = E[e3] = 0 and E[e2]  = o,2, the expected  difference  between the stochastic  and
deterministic  component  of the shadow  price for inventories  is approximately  the dispersion
premium:
EEVC(zd+e)  - V(zd)]  _  IV,n2  (3.7)
Even when demand  and inventories  are treated  as stochastic,  there is nothing  in the
23first or second-order  mnaximization  conditions  that would require  V= to be positive.  In
fact, V could certainly  be quadratic  in  . so that V.  need not exist.  However, in much of
the literature  on inventories  the shadow  price of inventories  is often described  as convex in
z - at least imnplicitly.'  Usually it is stated that there is some type of "pipeline"  mninimum
stock level (Figure 3.2).  As stock-levels  are drawn down and approach pipeline levels,
larger and larger price increases  are required  to deplete  diminished  inventories. Usually  the
convexity  is  attributed  to  a
convenience  yield. According  to this
argument,  pipeline  levels  are  Vz
required to carry out business in an
orderly  fashion,  while  additional
stocks,  up  to  a  point,  can  still  j
facilitate transactions or  minimize
costs such  as re-orders, deliveries,  or
restocking.  p
pipel  ine  z
As  it turns  out,  V=  will
exists if either of the marginal cost  Figure  3.2: Convex shadow  price for inventories.
functions, C,, the cost of physical storage, or C , the cost of production, are nonlinear.
This is true whether  or not the cost function is joint or whether  stocks are cost-reducing  at
any level.  A fundamental  question  is why the marginal  cost function should be convex in
either storage  or production  levels.  Copper storage is simplicity  itself, and requires only a
secure and dry area.  However, if storage and production  are joint and storage, at some
'For example,  Working  (1948),  p. 19 and Brennan  (1958),  p. 54.
24level, is cost-reducing, then there is probably some range over which the convenience
diminishes  rapidly as inventories  grow.
In  addition, marginal production costs are  also likely to  be  increasing at  an
increasing  rate over some production range, leading to nonlinearities  in the cost function.
The refining industry is constantly changing  and there is a wide diversity to the scale on
which refiners operate.  For example, one of the newest refining  plants in the US opened
in 1982 in South  Carolina (AT&T  Nasaue Recycle  Corp) with a relatively  small capacity  of
70,000 refined tons per year.  Since then capacity has grown to 87,500 tons.  For these
small plants, which attempt to control costs by runmning  near peak capacity, there remains
little room for production  increases. Alternatively,  the country's largest plant, ASARCO's
Texas plant, expanded  its huge 420,000 ton/year capacity  to 456,000 in 1987. At the same
time, parts of the facility are quite old.  Certainly under normal circumstances  ASARCO
could  probably increase  production  by 20,000 tons more readily than AT&T Nasaue. Still,
for the industry as a  whole, increasing production means bringing on line older and
increasingly less efficient facilities, operating with double shifts or  otherwise using
increasingly  more expensive inputs, both of which are likely to lead to convex marginal
costs.
Earlier it was stated that stochastic  demand  will give rise to stochastic inventories;
however, little was said about the relationship  between  the means  and variances  of the two
distributions. As it turns out, the problem  can be cast in terms of either stochastic  demand
or stochastic  price.  This result comes from the finance literature (for example, Cootner,
1964, and especially  Merton, 1992). There is long history of decomposing  inventories  into
expected and random components (planned and unplanned inventories), particularly in
25Keynesian  macroeconomnics.  Stochastic  prices are often employed in finance and capital
literature (for example, Black  and Scholes, 1973, or Abel, 1983).
For the copper-refining  problem  at hand, either interpretation  is appropriate. Since
there are no real restrictions  on trade or the recovery of scrap copper, US producers are
subject  to events  and decisions  made around  the world. On the demand side, copper is used
in products such as plumbing components,  wiring, and brass.  Not only does the derived
demand for these goods  fluctuate  with fluctuations  in those associated  industries  world-wide
(for example, the construction  of new homes), but demand is also subject to cross-price
effects from competing materials (for example, plastic plumbing components, or fiber-
optics). In addition, US refiners are not the only agents  who hold inventories. Speculators
hold inventories at both major exchanges  (COMEX and LME), fabricators (for example,
brass-mills)  often hold inventories at their plants, and non-US refiners hold inventories
overseas.  Domestic  market conditions  are also influenced  by the flow of new supplies,
either in the form of imports or in the supply of recycled  copper.
Refiners  would prefer  to know  exactly  about  events  in other sectors which influence
price and sales in their own market.  Ultimately, this is impossible  and some components
of final demand  and price will not be known  with certainty. In an abstract sense, the refiner
can be thought  of as knowing  the deterministic  component  of his demand  schedule  and the
general properties, but not the value of the stochastic  component. The production  function
presents less of a problem for the producer  since, unlike  agriculture  where weather,  disease,
and pests create  uncertainty, "ie yield of refined  copper  from a given set of inputs is known.
Still, the final level of production  - after adjustments  to unanticipated  changes  in demand
and price - is not known ahead  of time, but is conditional  on final demand  and price.  The
26initial stochastic term therefore originates in  the demand schedule but will ultimately
influence  sales as well. Normalizing  the demand  schedule  with respect  to quantity, sales are
stochastic;  normalizing  with respect to price, price is stochastic.
In the next section, estimation  results are presented  based on monthly  data for US
copper  refiners.  After  calculating  the  money  return  to  storage,
m(t)  * p(t)  -p(t-l)-r(t-l)p(t-l),  the following  two equations  are estimated  jointly:
m(t)  - Cp(t)-*  X  =Op(t)+u,(t)  (3.8)
3(t)  = C,(t)  + up(t)
The first equation  in 3.8 is a discrete version of the price-arbitrage  condition  given
in 3.11 plus an error term u,.  The second  equation  is taken from the first-order  conditions
given in Annex 1, and simply states that the producer will produce to the point where
marginal  cost equals  piice..  Merton's result is especially  handy in this application,  since  the
second of the two equations  provides a formal model for up, the stochastic  component  of
price.  By using instruments,  consistent  (in the econometric  sense) estimated  values ofup
can then be used to form a logically self-consistent  estimate of  2 . As noted earlier,
expressing  the constraint in terms of the unanticipated  component  of price rather than sales
or inventories is essentially a simple re-scaling of the constraint.  The symbol P=  is
therefore used to reflect  the re-scaled  value of V=.  The term Pm is treated as a constant
and estimated  directly as a parameter.  This treatment is equivalent  to assuming  that the
underlying  marginal  cost function  can be reasonably  approximated  by a quadratic. 2
These results are employed  in Section  4 of this paper to test for convexity  of the
2Recall  equation  A1.15.
27shadow  price for copper and provide an estimate  of the dispersion  premium  associated  with
copper inventories.  In addition, the model can also provide a test of jointness between
production and inventory-holding  which forns  the economic incentive for  a  Kaldor-
convenience  benefit.
284.0 Empirical  Results
In  this  section, results from  estimating the price-arbitrage and  marginal cost
functions, using monthly data on sales, production, and inventory levels for US copper
refiners, are presented. Before  the estimating  procedure  and results  are discussed  however,
the underlying  data is presented  in terms of the price-arbitrage  equation  developed  earlier
in Section 3.
Figure 4.1 plots the US producer price for refined copper against  inventories  held
by producers.  The data readily suggests  a convex relationship. This relationship  is not
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Figur 4.1: Monthly  constant  US  producer  prices  and  producer-held  inventories  for October
1979  through  Decemnber,  1989.
29unique  for copper, and the convex relationship  between  price and inventories is discussed
in much  of the literature  on inventories. For authors such as Working  and Brennan,  or more
recently  Stein and Famma, this relationship  is based on a convenience  yield. In most cost-
of-carry  models  the relationship  is ignored, although  an exception  is Williams  and Wright,
who argue that high prices result from the increasing  potential  for a stock-out.
Figure 4.2 maps  the spread' between  the closing  prices of the two nearest COMEX
copper  futures contracts  on the last day of the month against  monthly  closing  producer-held
inventories. Figure 4.3 maps the spread between the two futures prices with second and
third closest  settlement  dates. The spreads  become negative  when inventory  levels are low,
rising to near-zero positive levels with larger inventory  levels.  Again, this relationship  is
not unique  to copper. Working  (1948)  described  the same relationship  using wheat  data for
1926.  Brennan's  1958 article
provides a  number of  similar
graphs for eggs, cheese, butter,  b__w_n_two_c__  st_C_Xcontracts
wheat, and  oats.  Working,  0 O  a  0  .9 a  , 
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physical storage costs from the  I
Figure  4.2: Discounted  and  deflated  near-by  spreads  on the  last
spreads  to  quantify  the  day of the month  mapped  against  closing  producer  inventory
levels  for  October  1979  to December  1989.
'The spread is expressed  in constant  1985  cents per pound  and was calculated  as spread a
[F(t+  1)/(1  +r) - F(t)i/PPJ.,  where  the  future  with  the closest  settlement  date  is subtracted  from  the
more  distant  future's  price. The  difference  is then  deflated  by the  monthly  US  producer  price  index.
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aggregation  phenomena.  They
argue  that while the market in New York may promise  negative returns to storage, prices
are forward  in the geographically  diverse  markets  where the inventories  are actually  stored.
The generalized price-arbitrage condition developed in Section 3 suggests two
possible reasons for storage in backward markets.  First, the condition formalizes the
arguments  put forward by Kaldor and Working. As inventory  levels are drawn down, the
remaining  inventories  could  potentially  confer  greater and greater convenience  yields  -- that
is, the marginal cost-of-storage  function may become increasingly  negative.  The second
reason is that the convex shape of the shadow price function, which arises from non-
linearities in the cost function, conveys a dispersion premium when demand is uncertain.
For example,  when inventories  are low and demand  is unexpectedly  high, marginal  increases
in production become increasingly  expensive  and prices rise increasingly  quickly. At the
same time, stocks will be drawn down. Following  the reduction  in stocks, prices will rise
even  more  dramatically should  a  consecutive period  of  high  demand  materialize.
31Alternatively,  while  a drop in demand  may  be just as likely,  the effects  on price are not
symmnetric.  From  any  point  on the convex  marginal  cost  curve, the absolute  value  of the
price  drop  required  to lower  production  by a unit is less  than  the price  increase  required  to
increase  production  by a unit. Likewise,  a greater  price  change  is required  to draw  down
inventories  by a single  unit than  to increase  inventories  by a single  unit. This asymmetry
skews  the possible  outcome  of prices  (and  therefore  the shadow  price  of inventories)  toward
higher  prices  and  generates  a dispersion  premium. As a result,  not only  should  prices  be
higher  when inventory  levels  are low, but the distribution  of prices in general  should  be
skewed  toward  higher  values.
The distributional  characteristics  of the real  monthly  producer  prices  as well  as the
real  futures  prices  (as  observed  on the  last  day  of the  month)  for January  1980  to December
1989  are given  in Table  4.  1.2 The spot  prices  are US  producer  prices  (which  are used  in
the empirical  estimation
reported later  in  this  Table 4.1:  Distributional  characteristics of  monthly producer prices and
COMEX  end-of-month  copper futures  prices.
section),  while  the
futures :,rices are from  Standard Mean  Deviation  Skewness
the  COMEX in  New
Producer  price  0.91  0.24  0.97
York.  Because  of the  Nearby  future  0.83  0.25  1.06
One-ahead  future  0.83  0.23  1.01
difference in  market
Note: Futures prices are for COMEX high-grade  copper while spot
locations,  the means  are  prices are US producer  prices.  All prices are deflated  by the producer
price  index, 1985-100.
slightly  different.
2The  coefficient  of skewness  given  in Table  4.1 is E[(p - pT)]l  o,  so the  expected  value  for a
symmetric  distr.ibtion is 0.
32However, the spot and the futures series exhibit similar standard  deviations, and all three
series are skewed  with the long tail of the distribution  extending  toward higher prices.
In order to obtain the parameters  of the price-arbitrage  equation  derived in Section
3, as well as the parameters  of the marginal cost functions  and the dispersion premium,
variations of the following  two generalized  equations  were estimated:
M(t)  *  ¢,,(t) - t  (t)  +  V'M  (4.1)
p(t)  *C(  + 5(t)
where a.  and u.  are random errors, where m(t) *p(t)-p(t-1)-r(t-l)p(t-1)  is the
money-return  to storage,  p is the producer  price, C, and C, are marginal  cost functions  for
inventories,  z, and production,  y.  Several  functional  forms were considered  for C, andC,,
and these will be discussed  in greater detail later.
As discussed  earlier, the variance in the stochastic  differential  equation associated
with the change in copper inventories  can be expressed in terms of the variance in the
unanticipated  component  of the price for copper. In turn, the unanticipated  component  of
price is given by  u,  in 4.1, which can be used to construct an estimate of  2(t).  The
estination process involves  several stages. First, to avoid simultaneity  biases, instruments
were used to provide fitted values for endogenous  sales and production. Next, substituting
fitted values for endogenous  right-hand-side  variables, the second equation of 4.1  was
estimated  using least-squares. One result  is an unbiased  estimate  of the residual  vector, 3  .3
An  Il-month moving-variance  estimate,  2(t),  of  the variance of  the  unanticipated
3Since  a2(t)  may  vary  with  time, u, will  be heteroskedastic.  Nonetheless,  the  2SLS  estimates
for il,  alithough  inefficient,  will  be unbiased.  (See  Kennedy,  1992,  p. 114.)
33component  of  producer  price  O2(t)  was  then  constructed  from  4,  where
2  -l  t-I
6,(t), m  [4,(n)-  p(n)]  /(l-l)  and  i,(t)O  ()  ,(n)  is  the  moving-mean.
Following the construction of  2p(t), both  equations of  4.1  were estimated together
simultaneously  as the final stage of a three-stage least-squares  procedure.  As discussed
earlier, P.  is treated as a constant and estimated directly as a parameter.  The entit-
62  Qdconstitutes  an estimate  of the dispersion-premnium.
The choice of a functional-form  for the underlying cost-function, C(z,y),  had to
meet several criteria.  First, the form had to be  flexible enough to allow third-order
derivatives  and jointness between inventories  and production, that is CI,, Co, C,  I Cm,
etc. had to be potentially  non-zero. The following  log-linear  equations  were used initially
to approximate the marginal cost functions C,  and  C,  from 4.1,  since they meet the
criterion  with a paucity  of estimated  parameters:
C,  = bo +  blnz  +  b2 ny +  bx  +  b4 lnw  +  b5nf  (4.2)
C  =  Co  + clnz  + c2lny +  c3lnx + c4 inw  + c 5 lnf
where the b 1 and cl for i =  0,,..._  are fixed  parameters. The choice  of functional  fonn has
implications -- especially for the underlying marginal cost-of-storage  function.  These
implications,  along with more general and more restricted functional  forms, are discussed
later in this section.
The process of refining  copper, explained  in Section  2, is relatively simple, which
helps limit the number  of parameters  in 4.2.  In addition  to inventory  levels  and production
levels, the price of electricity,  x, the price of raw input copper, w, and the capacity  of the
refining  plants,  f, are given  as arguments  of the cost function. All prices are deflated  by the
US producer  price index  which  serves as a proxy for omitted  prices (primarily  wages). The
34cost-function  C(y,z)  is initially  modeled  as joint.  The  second-derivative  functions,  C,, and
CX are not constrained  to be symmetric,  although  symmetry  is later tested.
Monthly  data covering  a period from September  1978  through December 1989  was
used in the estimation. Production,  sales, and producer-held  inventories  were taken from
various issues of World Metal Statisdcs. The price of refined  copper was taken as the US
producer  price for refined  copper  from various issues  of Metl  Statisdcs.  The price of No.
2 Scrap (New York) served as the price of raw input copper and also came from Metal
Statstis.  The price for industrial  electricity  was taken from various issues  of the United
States  Department  of Energy  publication  Monthly Energy Review. The interest rate used
was the 30-day US Treasury Bill rate.  All prices and the interest rate were converted  to
constant 1985-dollar  values, using the US Producer Price Index.  The Treasury Bill and
Producer Price data was taken from the International  Monetary  Fund's Financial  Statistics
data base.  The data on copper refinery capacity is collected  by the American  Bureau of
Metal Statistics, Inc and reported in various issues of Non-Ferrous Metal Data.  The
capacity  is reported  at the plant level, based on surveys  of plant  managers. For most periods
the combined  capacity  of all plants  greatly  exceeded  production  levels. Plant managers  may
have an incentive  to exaggerate  capacity  levels (to forestall new entrants)  and have no real
incentive  to be accurate. In addition,  the sur"ey is only reported once a year.  As a result,
the data was treated as suspicious. However,  using instruments  and a smoothing  technique
designed to  detect errors-in-variables  problems did  not affect  the estimation results
materially. Results  of this procedure are reported later in this section. During the period
a major  strike  by labor unions  dramatically  reduced  refinery  output from July 1980  through
October 1980.  An intercept-dunmmy  variable, k, was used to designate the observations
35associated  with the strike.  These atypical observations  were, however, illustrative of the
relationship  between  inventories  and uncertainty,  as will be seen later during the discussion
of the simulation  results.
The initial modcl was estimated  from:
m(t) - bo +  b9,.t)  +  b2 lh(t)  +  b,lx(t)  +  b.lnw(t)  +  bslqt)  +  bsk(t) - ,  V02(t)  +  ut)  (43)
p(t) - co  +1,ln(t) + c2ln(t)  + c.lnx(t) +  c 4lnw(t)  +  CsW(t)  +  clk(k) +  .(g)
In the first-stage  of the estimation  process,  fitted values  for Int(t)  and In9(t)  were obtained
by regressing the log of inventory  and production levels on the instruments  given in Table
4.2 using OLS.  The regressions resulted in R2s  of .93 and .69, respectively.  In the
second-stage  of the estimation  process, the fitted  values  for the log of production  and the log
of inventories were substituted into
the  second  equation  of  4.3,  and  Table  4.2: Instruments  used for fittee values  of the log of invenwories  and the log  of sales.
estimates of the random-component
of  price,  fi(t)  were  estimated  by  interest  rate
price  of electricity
least-squares.  A  six-month moving  scrap-copper  price
fixed  capacity  level
variance,  d:,  was constructed  from  log of the price  of electricity
log of the scrap-copper  price
log of fixed  capacity  level
the resulting residuals and  month  of the observation
year of the observation
included  on  the  RHS  of  the  first  lagged  production  level
laued inventory  level
equation  in  4.3.4  Simultaneously  lag of production  level  squared
lag of inventory  level  squared
estimating  both  equations  as  the
4Results  from the six-month  moving  variance  are emphasized  here because  the model  providcd
the maximum  likelihood  estimate  among  the lag-length  choices. At a practical  level,  however,  models
using  four, five,  seven,  or eight-month  moving-variances  were  not  statistically  different  from  the  six-
month  model  when  subjected  to a likelihood  ratio  test.
36third-stage in  a  three-  Tabb 4.3: Estinated paruneters and  t-scores.
stage  least-squares  Parameter  Estimate  t-score
procedure  yielded  the  DiserlSion  coefficifl
results  given in  Table  V.  8.94  4.97
Marginal  cost of storge  (C.) coefficients
4.3,  which  gives  the
bo.  intercept  1.81  4.09
estimated  coefficients,  bl, inventories  0.04  1.89
b,, production  0.06  1.25
b 3, electricity  price  0.43  3.12
and  Table  4.4,  which  b,, scrap  copper  price  0,22  4.91
bs. capacity  -0.11  -2.22
expresses  the coefficients  b 5, strike  0.06  1.23
as  elasticities.  T'he  Murtinal cost of production  {C> coeffickjis
results,  for  the  most  co.  intercept  0.39  0.68
c,,  inventories  0.09  4.11
part,  were insensitive to  c2,  production  0.16  2.21
C3,  electricity  price  -0.46  -2.70
alternative choices  for  c4, sCMp  copper  price  0.66  10.82 cs, capacity  40.23  -3.66
c,, strikce  0.14  1.86
the  length of  the  lag
used to construct 6,  as
well as the estimation  method. Alternative  estimates  are discussed  later.
The estimate  of the dispersion  premium is positive  and significant  at a greater-than
99% level of confidence.  All of the arguments to the marginal cost functions C, are
significant  at 97%  + confidence  level, with the exceptions  of the intercept  and the coefficient
on the strike dummy.  At the mean, marginal production  costs are rising with additional
production and are reduced by additions  to capacity.  Evaluated at the mean, additional
inventory  slightly  increases  the marginal  cost of production. A 1  % increase in the price of
scrap copper increases marginal production costs by 739%. The elasticity of marginal
production costs with respect to the price of electricity is negative, implying the unlikely
37Table 4.4: Estimated  parameters  of marginal  cost hinctions  expressed  elasticities,  and estimated  averaged
dispersion  premium.
Estimated hfctions  evabuated  at seris'  mea:
'Me elsticity  of  C.  C,
with respect to:
inventories  1.93  0.09
production  3.32  0.18
electricity  price  22.75  0.51
scrap copper price  11.79  0.73
refinery  capacity  -5.82  -0.25
strike dummy  3.21  0.16
Average dispersion premium
In cents per pound:  1.41
Note: Elasticities  and dispersion  premium  calculated  at muns.  a,  is constructed  by a six-month  moving
variance  of second-stage  price-forecast  residuals  for refined  copper.
conclusion  that marginal  production  costs fall as utilities  raise their rates. While a negative
elasticity is unlikely, it may be that, in the short-run for a given fixed set of plant and
equipment,  energy costs are relatively fixed so that the elasticity is properly zero.  As it
turns out, constraining  the elasticity on the price of electricity  to zero has little effect on
subsequent  hypothesis  testing or simulation  results. This topic is discussed  more fully later
in this section.
The estimates  associated  with the marginal cost of storage are more mixed.  The
elasticity with respect to inventory levels has the expected  sign, and is significant  with a
93%  +  level of confidence.  The elasticity with respect to  production levels and the
coefficient  on the strike dummy are not significant 5. The electricity, scrap copper, and
refinery capacity  elasticities  are significant. The sign on the refinery capacity  is negative,
5Although  both  strike  dummies  are  not  significant  individually,  when  subjected  t? a Wald-test  they
are  jointly  significant  with  a 99%  confidence  level.
38which is reasonable  since  larger refinery  capacity  is probably  associated  with a larger facility
with more storage space.  The electricity  elasticity is positive, which is also reasonable  if
the storage  facilities  are either lighted  or heated. Mysteriously,  the elasticity  associated  with
the price of scrap copper is also positive and significant. Later, results are presented from
constrained  versions of the marginal cost-of-storage  function including  constant marginal
storage costs, as asserted in cost-of-carry  models, and non-joint  costs.  As it turns out, the
significance  and the size of the dispersion  premium varies little under alternative  versions
of the model.
The estimated  model  was simulated  in order to calculate  average  marginal  production
costs, average marginal storage costs, and the average dispersion premium.  The average
levels, along with the minimum and maximum  values simulated for these functions, are
reported in Table 4.5.  The marginal  storage  costs are on-average  low but reasonable  at 1.9
cents per  pound.  The
Table 4.5: Simulated  values for the marginal cost of production (Cr), the
range, from  around  5  marginal  cost of storage  (C), and the dispersion  premium.
cents  to  11  cents  is  Average  Minimum  Maximum
reasonable andl suggests  ---------- cents per pound ------------
C.  1.9  -4.8  11.0
some  scope  for  a  Cy  87.7  56.5  126.0
Premium  1.4  0.0  9.4
convenience-yield. The
average  levels  and
ranges of the marginal  cost of production  and the dispersion  premium appeared reasonable
as well.
Figure 4.4 maps  the simulated  dispersion  premium  against  actual  producer inventory
levels.  With the exception  of about 15 observations,  the simulated  dispersion premiums
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Figure 4.4: Simulated  dispersion  premiums  for March 1980 to December 1989.
behave as expected, climbing when inventories are low and dropping off quickly when
inventories  grow.  The outliers were generated  by either a strike, the threat of a strike, or
war, all of which resulted  in a higher dispersion  premium. In the figure, the outliers  marked
with a 1 represent the three months leading up to the anticipated  1980 copper strike, and
observations  marked with an s are months  during the strike. The observations  marked  with
a 2 represent  a period in 1983  when another labor strike seemed  likely, but which ended  as
negotiations  were successfully  concluded, starting with Kennecott's provisional  agreement
with its unions in April (Crowser  and Thompson, 1984). Finally, the observations  marked
with an f represent the Falkland crisis (April to June, 1982).  For those months, price
variability  and the dispersion  premium  grew  despite  moderate  inventories  of refined  copper.
Although estimated  from data on US producer  production, price, and inventories,
the model behaves  as expected  vis-a-vis the futures market in New York.  The simulation
results indicate  that, in the case of copper, information  about  price spreads in New  York can
be used to predict dispersion  premiums  for US producers scattered  across the country. As
40shown in Section  3, inventories  are rationally  held when a price fall is anticipated  provided
the dispersion prenmum  is sufficiently large.  Further,  in the absence of a dispersion
premium, backwardation  in the futures  market generates  powerful  incentives  to arbitrage  the
market intertemporally.  As a result,  the dispersion  premium  for inventory-holders,  including
US producers, should be higher  during periods of extended  backwardation  on the COMEX.
Otherwise,  inventories  would  flow  to New  York  to take  advantage  of arbitrage  opportunities.
To test this aspect of the model's performance,  the sample period  was divided into two sub-
samples.  Observations were  categorized as  "backward market" observations if  the
discounted spread between the second and third nearest COMEX contracts (the spreads
shown graphically in Figure 4.3)  was negative; the observation was categorized as a
"forward  market" observation  if the spread was positive.  The spread between the second
and third closest contracts was chosen to categorize the observations  since it would allow
time for the copper to be physically shipped.  Of the observations, about 48% were
"backward-market"  observations.  Average  spreads  and dispersion  premiums  were calculated
from the two samples and are reported on the first line of Table 4.6.  In addition,
observations  associated  with
Table 4.6:  Average spreads and  simulated dispersion premiums
wars,  strikes,  or  anticipated  during periods of backward and forward  COMEX markets.
strikes were removed from both  backward markets  forward markets
average  average  average  average
samples,  and  means  were  Sample  spread  premium  spread  premium
calculated  for  the  "purged"  per pound
Full  -3.22  1.85  0.44  0.98
samples  as  well.  In  the  Purged  -3.38  1.80  0.40  0.48
"purged"  sample,  roughly  53%  Note: In  the  purged sample, observations  associated with
anticipated  strikes, strikes, or wars were removed. Spreads
of  the  observations  were  are discounted  and reported in constant  cents  per pound.
41categorized  as "backward  market" observations. The means from this sample  are reported
in the second line of Table 4.6.  For the "backward  market" sample, the spread averaged -
3.22 cents and the simulated  value of the dispersion  premium averaged 1.85 cents. For the
"forward market" sample, the spread averaged 0.44  cents and the average dispersion
premium dropped in half to 0.98 cents.  Purging the samples  of war and labor unrest, the
difference was more dramatic, with the average dispersion  dropping from 1.80 cents in the
"backward  market" sample  to 0.48 cents in the "forward market" sample.
Figure 4.5 maps  the simulated  marginal  costs against  production  levels. The  outliers
again are the strike months, when US production  was constrained. Interestingly,  some of
the highest marginal costs occurred in the months prior to the strike as inventories  were
accumulated  to substitute  for anticipated  drops in production.
Figure 4.6  maps the simulated cost of  storage against inventory levels.  The
estimated  elasticity  of marginal  storage  costs with respect to inventory  levels is positive  but
insignificant,  and it is difficult  to discern  any clear pattern from the plotted data.  If refined
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Figure 4.5: Simulated  marginal  production  costs.
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F!g  4.6: Simulated  marginal  storage costs.
copper inventories do indeed generate a Kaldor-convenience, then negative marginal storage
costs should be associated with low levels of inventories.  Further,  after inventory levels
reach  some rninimal levels,  the  marginal  costs  should become  positive  as the  marginal
"convenience"  disappears. In simulation, however,  iany  of the most negative  values for
the marginal cost of storage are associated with relatively high inventory levels.  Later in
this section, the issues of jointness and Kaldor-convenience are examined under  alternative
specifications.
The estirnation and simulation results presented to this point are not sensitive to the
lag-length chosen to generate the movir,g-variance for the random component of producer
prices. Nor are the results sensitive  to the estimation  technique  chosen. In addition  to the
three-stage  least-squares  estimaes presented  earlier, the model  was also estimnated  using two
43Tabl  4.7: Summary  statistics  on the estimated  dispersion  premium  under alternative  estimation  methods  and
alternative  lag-lengths  for the price-variance  measure  for the log-linear  model.
maximum  .....  2SLS-----  -----  LIML-----  ---- 3SLS-----
lag on  t-score premium  premium  t-score premiumpremium  t-score  premium  premium
variance  on V,  mean  std  on V.  mean  std  on V,,  mean  std
4  7.01  1.21  2.13  4.96  1.21  2.13  5.94  1.11  1.96
5  5.09  1.29  1.99  5.93  1.29  1.99  4.65  1.22  1.88
6  5.21  1.46  2.09  8.03  1.46  2.09  4.97  1.41  2.00
7  4.81  1.44  1.98  8.03  1.44  1.98  4.67  1.39  1.90
8  3.78  1.33  1.77  7.60  1.33  1.77  3.65  1.28  1.70
9  3.53  1.38  1.77  7.63  1.38  1.77  3.37  1.30  1.68
Note: the hypothesis  that the shadow-price  of copper inventories  is not strictly  convex  could be rejected
with a 99% + level of confidence  under all estimation  methods  and all moving-variance  choices.  The
mean and standard  deviations  reported  in the table are from simulations  of the estimated  models.
alternative instrumental variable techniques  - two-stage least-squares and  limnited-
information-maximnum-likelihood.  Because  endogenous  variables  appear  as regressors  in4. 1,
instruments  or full-information  likelihood  techniques  are required  to avoid biased  estimates.
However, all instrumental  variable  techniques  should  be consistent. If the model  is correctly
specified, three-stage least-squares  should produce the most efficient unbiased estimates,
since  the  procedure  includes  information  on the contemporaneous  variance-covariance  matrix
of the structural equations' dIsturbances.  In practice, with limited sample sizes, the
superiority  of one method over another becomes less clear.  Kennedy (1992, pp. 166-167)
reports the results from  several Monte Carlo studies that examine the sensitivity of
estimators  to changes  in sample size, specification  errors, multicollinearity,  etc.  Kennedy
concludes that Monte Carlo studies consistently rank two- and three-stage least-squares
estimators  quite high in terms of robustness. At a practical level, the estimates  should be
similar.  In fact, Hausman  (1978)  has argued that large differences  between  estimators  that
are consistent  is, in itself, a sign of misspecification.
44Table 4.7  reports the t-score6  associated with estimates of  P  from the three
estimators  under alternative specifications  for d:(t).  The table also reports the average
simulated  premium calculated  from the estimate, as well as the standard deviation  of the
simulated  premium.  The estimated  coefficient  on the moving-variance, J=,  was always
positi - and significant  - that is, the hypothesis  that the shadow  price of inventories  is not
strictly positive could be  rejected regardless of the lag-length chosen in the variance
calculation and regardless of the estimation technique.  Further, the distribution of the
simulated  premiums  was  quite stable  across  variance-choices  and estimation  techniques. This
was less true for the extreme values of the various simulations. Minimum  values for all
simulations  were slightly  greater than zero, while  maximum  values  ranged between  slightly
above 7 cents to slightly under 14 cents.  Extreme  values consistently  declined  as the lag-
length increased, regardless  of estimation  technique.
As discussed  earlier, the unconstrained  estimation  of the model retumed the wrong
sign  for the price elasticity  for electricity. The model  was re-estimated  under the assumption
that energy  costs  are detem-ined  primarily  by plant  and equipment  and that the correct short-
run coefficient value should be  zero.  Since the t-score on the original estimate was
significant, the constraint is a binding one; however, imposing  the constraint had little
practical consequence.  Regardless  of the estimation  procedure  or lag-length  chosen for the
moving variance, P.  remained positive and significant.  The three-stage least-squares
estimates  for a range of lag-length  choices  are reported in Table 4.8.  Further, Wald tests
6The  t-scores  reported  in Table  4.6 (and  later in Table  4.7) for the two- and three-stage  least-
squares  results  are computed  by TSP  Version  6 to be robust  in the presence  of heteroskedasticity
using White's method.  This procedure  tended  to lower the t-score compared  to alternative
calculations.
45were constructed to see  Tabb 4.8: Tests on the effects  of excluding  the price of electricity  from the
marginal  cost-of-production  fmction.
if  the  values  of  the
maxium  lag In  t-score  4J  test
remaining  fourteen  moving variance  on V.  score
parameters  changed  4  6.51  1.04
5  4.56  0.48
when  the  price  of  6  4.91  0.55
7  4.62  0.64
electricity was excluded  8  3.62  0.60
9  3.33  0.58
from the marginal cost-
Note: Under the maintained  hypothesis  that electricity use is a  fixed
of-production  un tion.  cost, the hypothesis  that shadow  prices are not convex can be rejected
at a 99%  +  level of confidence  for all moving-variance  choices.  The
The test was cf  instructed  hypothesis  that excluding  the prke of electricity  from the marginal  cost-
of-production function does not  change the  remaining coefficient
estimates  cannot  be rejected  at any reasonable  level of confidence. The
by pairing each of the  Wald-test  is distributed  as X2  with I degree-of-freedom.
remaining  fourteen
parameter estimates  from the three-stage  least-squares  estimates  of the two models - one
model including  the price of electricity, and one model excluding  the price of electricity.
When  the exclusion  does not affect the estimates  for the fourteen  parameters,  the sum of the
differences between the parameters will be jointly zero.  As can be seen in the second
column  of Table 4.8, the hypothesis  that the estimated  parameters  are not different  could  not
be rejected  with any reasonable  level of confidence.
As discussed  earlier, the existence of the dispersion  premium depends in part on
non-linearities  in the marginal  cost-of-storage  and production  function. The log-linear  form
chosen for the marginal cost functions  (4.2) has the advantage  of being nonlinear while
requiring few estimated  parameters.  However, there is a tradeoff between the practical
advantage  of having  fewer parameters  to estimate  and fiexibility  in the functional  form. This
is particularly  true given that the marginal  cost-of-storage  function  is usually depicted  as s-
46shaped (recall Figure 3.4).  For this particular functional  form, a positive coefficient  on
inventories  in the cost-of-storage  equation  implies  that the marginal  cost-of-storage  function
is increasing as inventories  accumulate,  but at a decreasing rate -- that is, C.  = b2/z and
C=  -b2/z2. Often inventory-storage  costs are expected  to rise first at a declining rate
(C=  is at first negative), but then to rise increasingly  rapidly (so that C.  is positive)  as
storage facilities reach full capacity.  While storage capacity for some grains or frozen
commodities  is strictly limited, refined copper is easily stored and not subject to the same
type of storage-capacity  limits.  Nonetheless,  in order to test whether the results reported
above are dependent on the functional  form chosen, a more general form, qtiadratic  with
third-order terms for z and y, was estimated as well.  More specifically, the following
marginal  cost functions  were substituted  for 4.2:
5  5  s
Cs=bo+  b1Xi+  bXIX,j + b 7t3
,  1  1  (4.2b)
C, - Co  +  cxi +  C  C jVZIX  + C 793
where Xi,  for  i  1,2,...,5 represents  z, y, x, w, and f from 4.2.  The estimation  procedure
was repeated  on:
5  55
1  11~~~~~~~~~  m(t) =  bo  +  biX,  +  EbuX,Xj  +  b6  k(t) +  b723  - 2  d2  +  CI(t)
(4.3b)
p(t)  - co  +  cX  +  rcuXX  +  ¢6k(t) + C 7 9  +  (t)
using the three estimation  techniques  and the six specification  of 6(t)
The more general  quadratic-plus  form generated  an additional  thirty-two  parameters
to estimate. For the base model  (three-stage  least-squares  using a six-month  lag to generate
476;(t),  only seventeen  of the forty-seven  estimated  parameters  were individually  significant
at a 90% confidence  level.  These parameters and their t-scores are given in Annex II.
Nonetheless, P.  proved relentlessly  significant  regardless of the estimation  technique  or
lag-length  choice.  In simulation,  the quadratic  version produced  lower average premiums,
primarily due to  lower maximum values.  The maximum simulated values across the
estimated  models  did not decline  as the lag-length  on the variance was increased. Rather,
the range was more limited, from 4.92 cents to 7.16 cents, and showed no clear pattern.
Table 4.9 provides the summary  results for the quadratic-plus  estimations.
Evaluated  at the mean  of the series, the linear function  Cm turned  out to be negative
at a 97%  +  level of confidence,  although, in simulation, C=  did take on small positive
values when inventories were extremely high.  At the same time, C.,  which should be
positive, turned out to be negative  on average, although  not significantly  so.  In summary,
despite  the fact that many  of its parameters  proved insignificant,  the estimated  quadratic-plus
Table 4.9: Summary  statistics  on the estimated  dispersion  premium  under alternative  estimation  methods  and
alternative  lag-lengths  for the price-variance  measure for the quadratic  model.
m.aximum  ----  2SLS --  ---- LIML  --  3SLS
lag on  t-score premium  premium  t-score premiumpremium  t-score  premium  premium
variance  on V.  mean  std  on V.  mean  std  on V.  mean  std
4  2.72  0.42  1.12  2.47  0.42  1.12  2.39  0.39  1.02
5  1.65'  0.42  1.01  2.62  0.42  1.01  1.63'  0.42  1.01
6  2.43  0.54  1.26  3.28  0.54  1.24  2.43  0.54  1.24
7  2.69  0.52  1.19  2.61  0.52  1.19  2.68  0.52  1.19
8  2.71  0.51  1.14  2.42  0.51  1.14  2.71  0.51  1.14
9  2.85  0.55  1.18  2.42  0.55  1.18  2.83  0.55  1.18
Note: the hypothesis  that the shadow-price  of copper inventories  is not strictly  convex  could be rejected
with  a 99%  + level of confidence  under  most estimation  methods  and moving-variance  choices. The  two
scores marked with an  *  were significant  at a 94%  +  level of confidence.  The mean and standard
deviations  reported in the table are from simulations  of the estimated  models.
48model supports  the notion of a dispersion  premium, while suggesting  that the extreme-case
premiums  are quantitatively  smaller than those simulated  by the log-linear  model.  At the
same time, while the marginal  cost-of-storage  function  was given greater flexibility, it did
not trace out the classic path of rising slowly to an inflection  point, and then rising more
rapidly.
Despite  the consistency  of the estimates  and simulations, one potential problem is
shared by all of the specifications. Since industry-wide  refinery capacity  is only published
once a  year, the annual figure was repeated for all twelve months of  the year when
estimating the model.  On the one hand, shadow prices for inventories are based on
expectations, and it could well be that the market expectations must be based on the
published  refinery data since  no better source of information  exists. Alternatively,  since  the
number of refiners is small, industry participants  may form better subjective  estimates  of
capacity. Regardless,  there is certainly  the potential  for measurement  error in the variable.
The practical consequences  of an errors-in-variables  problem cannot be readily known. If
the measurement  error  is distributed independently of the disturbance terms, then t" 1e
estimates remain consistent.  However, if  not,  the  estimates may be  biased even
asymptotically. Since the exact nature of an errors-in-variables  problem can never be
known, the correct course of action cannot  be known. In "correcting"  the problem, the cuie
may be worse than the disease  -- if indeed  a disease  exists. The general prescription  for an
errors-in-variables  problem is to use instruments  for the problem regressor  or to somehow
average out the effects of the measurement  errors. (Kennedy, 1991 pp.  137-40.)  The
rationale is that by averaging  out the data, the measurement  errors are averaged as well,
reducing their impact.  Table 4.10 reports the parameter estimates after addressing the
49Table 4.10: Estirnated  parameters  and t-scores (in parentheses)  for base model  and model  treated for assumed
errors-in-variables  problem.
Durbin  in-year
base model  rank method  smoothing
In equation m(t)
coeffcient on:
intercept:  1.81  1.28  1.84
(4.09)  (2.76)  (4.04)
inventories:  0.04  0.02  0.03
(1.89)  (1.22)  (1.25)
production:  0.06  0.04  0.06
(1.25)  (0.80)  (1.06)
electricity:  0.43  0.48  0.42
(3.12)  (3.58)  (2.62)
scrap copper:  0.22  0.22  0.21
(4.91)  (4.68)  (4.52)
capacity:  -0.11  0.01  -0.11
(-2.22)  (1.47)  (-1.49)
price variance:  8.94  8.10  8.91
(4.97)  (4.96)  (4.50)
strike dummy:  0.06  0.04  0.07
(1.23)  (0.72)  (1.12)
In equation p(t)
coefricient  cn:
intercept:  0.39  -0.87  1.07
(0.68)  (-1.44)  (1.86)
inventories:  0.09  0.05  0.13
(4.11)  (3.07)  (5.00)
production:  0.16  0.14  0.14
(2.21)  (2.03)  2.06
electricity:  -0.46  -0.36  -0.65
(-2.70)  (-2.24)  (-3.51)
scrap copper:  0.66  0.66  0.64
(10.82)  (10.62)  (10.61)
capacity:  -0.23  0.04  -0.39
(-3.66)  (4.1)  (-4.86)
strike dummy:  0.14  0.12  0.14
(1.86)  (1.82)  (2.04)
errors-in-variables  problem  two ways. The first column  represents  the coefficients  from the
base model, repeated from Table 4.3.  The second column lists parameter estimates
following  a treatment  for the errors-in-variables  problem  suggested  by Durbin (see Kennedy,
50p.  140, or Johnston, pp. 430-2).  Following  this procedure, the observations  on refining
capacity  were ranked  from highest  to lowest. Observations  on the rank were then substituted
as an instrument  for the observations  on capacity.  Since the capacity was ranked from
highest  to lowest, the sign on the capacity  coefficients  switched  and, of course, the scale of
the capacity coefficients  changed.  Otherwise, the effects of treating the estimation for
measurement  errors in the capacity  variable  were negligible. Column  three of Table 4.10
reports estimation  results in which  the annual observations  were smoothed. The smoothing
procedure was to measure the difference  between refining capacity  for any two years and,
from the January observation  for the first year, add one-twelfth  of the difference  to each
monthly  observation. Again, the effects  of the smoothing  procedure  on the estimation  results
are quite marginal.
As mentioned  earlier, Hausman  has argued that estimates  obtained  from alternative
but consistent  estimators  should  themselves  be consistent. Based  on this principal,  Hausnian
proposed the following  test for misspecification. Two sets of consistent estimates are
differenced  and then standalrdized  by the difference  in the covariance  matrices  of the two sets
of estimates. The resulting  quadratic  form is asymptotically  chi-squared,  with the degrees
of freedom  equal to the number  of linearly  independent  rows in the differenced  covariance
matrix.  The model fails the test, signaling misspecification  of the model, when the
hypothesis  that the two estimate  sets are the same can be rejected. The estimation  package
TSP Version  6.0 provides a matrix procedure for calculating  the Hausman  test. Table 4.11
reports the results of the Hausman test based on the difference  between the three-stage
(consistent  and efficient)  parameter estimates  and both two-stage  and limited-infonration
(consistent)  parameter  estimates. Since  different  algorithms  are used to numerically  compute
51Tabk 4.11: Hausman  test for misspecification  based  on LIML, 2SLS and 3SLS  estimates  for varying  moving-
variance  calculations.
- three-stage least-squares compared to alternative estimators -
twotage  kast-squares  Ihmited-lnformatlon  maxinum-likelihood
maximum  lag in  degrees  of  degrees  of
moving  variance  freedom  test-score  freedom  test-score
4  2  0.34  6  0.02
5  2  0.21  5  0.01
6  1  0.06  7  0.01
7  1  0.05  8  0.02
8  1  0.01  8  0.02
9  1  0.00  8  0.00
Note: Test-scores  ae  distributed  as X2. The  hypothesis  that the two sets of estimates  are equal could not
be rejected  with any reasonable  level of confidence.
the three estimates, they will in practice yield different estimates.  The Hausman test
measures  whether  the estimates  are critically  different. The test was repeated  using various
lag-lengths in  the moving-variance  calculation.  Under all versions of  the model the
hypothesis  that efficient  and consistent  estimates  were equal could  not be rejected with any
reasonable  level of confidence.
Earlier simulation and estimation results cast some doubt on the existence of a
Kaldor-convenience  for refined  copper  inventories. Kaldor  and, later, Working  and Brennan
argued that a convenience  yield exists when storage is a  necessary adjunct to business,
which, in the case of copper refining, implies a jointness in the cost of production and
storage. Further, if this convenience  yield  effectively  explains  periods of backwardation  and
a negative  price for storage, then the marginal  cost of storage must be negative  over some
range of low inventory  levels. Contrasted  against  this is the assertion  in many cost-of-carry
models  that marginal  storage costs are fixed and positive.
52Table 4.12 reports the test results on three hypotheses  about inventory  costs.  All
three tests are constructed  as Wald tests so the test scores have a chi-square  distribution.
The symmetry  test tests the hypothesis  that C. = C, I evaluated  at the mean for the series.
If the true underlying cost function is joint, then Young's theorem states that the partial
second derivatives  should  be equal.  The hypothesis  of symmetry  is rejected  when the test-
score exceeds  a critical value. The results of the symmetry  test are mixed  and are sensitive
to the moving variance chosen in the estimation  model.  For lag-lengths  4 and 9,  the
hypothesis  of symmetry  could be rejected  at a 90% confidence  level.
The second column of Table 4.12 tests the hypothesis that the cost function is
actually non-joint.  This test is constructed to be quite weak in the sense that only the
coefficients  on production  in the marginal  cost of storage  and on inventories  in the marginal
cost of production (b 2 and cl  in equation 4.2) were constrained  to zero.  This left, for
Table 4.12: Tests related to the marginal  cost of storage.
tests on hypotheses of ----------------------------
maimum lag hi  constant
moving variance  symmetry  non-joint  costs  marginal  costs
Wald  test scores  ----------------
4  5.210  2.19  15.24"
S  2.04  4.420  17.93"
6  1.37  7.87"  24.79"
7  1.32  10.86"  27.73"
8  2.30  10.50"  26.02"
9  279'  8.77"  26.41"
Note: All tests wer  constructed  as Wald  tests  distributed  as X 2 with  one degree  of freedom. Test scores
denoted  with  an * are  significant  at a 90% + confidence  level. Test  scores marked  with  an 0are significant
at a 95%+  level of confidence  and test scores marked with - are significant  at a greater-than  99%
confidence  level.
53example, the price of scrap copper as an cxplanatory  variable in the marginal cost of
storage. Despite  the weak  definition,  the hypothesis  of a non-joint  cost-function  was rejected
at a 95% + level of confidence  for all but the four-month  moving-variance  models. Using
a stronger definition  of non-jointness,  which would  exclude the price of scrap copper from
the marginal  cost-of-storage  function  cl =  b 2 = b4  = 0, non-jointness  was  rejected  for all models
with a 99%  + level of confidence.
The third column reports the results on the test that marginal storage costs are
constant, as proponents  of cost-of-carry  models often assert.  Constant  storage costs imply
that bi -0,  for i = 1,2,3,4,5 (from equation  4.2) in the estimated  model.  This hypothesis
was rejected  at greater-than  99% confidence  levels for all moving-variance  choices.
Kaldor argued that the adjunct nature of selling and storing provides the economic
rationale for convenience.  For copper producers this means a jointness between the
activities of producing, selling, and storing copper.  Others have argued that inventory
activity is less complex, and, in the case of most cost-of-carry  models, storage costs can
simply be best described by a constant marginal cos;.  The test results provide strong
evidence  that marginal storage costs are not constant, as asserted in cost-of-carry  models.
Further, the combined  results on the tests of symmetry  and jointness  provide  somewhat  less
strong support to the notion  that costs are joint.  Still, a Kaldor-convenience  yield relies on
more than  jointness.  Inventories  are expected  to yield their highest marginal  convenience
as inventories  are initially  accumulated  - that is, the marginal  cost of inventories  is expected
to be negative  at low levels, but grow positive as additional  inventories  build. None of the
estimated models presented here displayed  that characteristic. Rather, the evidence here
suggests that, although inventories are a necessary adjunct to business, they generate no
54savings.
As stated  earlier, the existence  of a dispersion  premium is sufficient  to justify storage
during arn  anticipated  price decline and strong empirical  evidence  was presented  to support
the existence  of such a premium. The estimation  results reported thus far have come from
joint-cost models.  Table 4.13 reports tests on the hypothesis that the shadow price for
copper  inventories  is convex  under two maintained  hypotheses. The first column  reports test
scores on the hypothesis
that  the  estimated  Table 4.13:  Tests on convexity of  the shadow price for refined copper
inventories  under  non-joint  costs and constant  marginal  storage  costs.
parameter  is  less-
than  or  equal  to  zero  ~  in~  ing ~  - maintained hypotheses  ---
te  tmaximum  lag In  non-joint  constant
moving variance  cost function  marginal  cost
under  the  maintained  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
--------- t-scores-------
hypothesis  that the cost-  4  4.61  4.69
3.48  3.88
function  is  not  joint.  7  3.892  3.93
8  2.73  2.41
The results here include  9  2.32  2.04
the  assertion  that  Note: The hypothesis  that shadow  prices are not convex  can be rejected
at a 99%  + level of confidence  under  both maintained  hypotheses  for all
marginal  storage  costs  moving-variance  choices.
have nothing to do with
the cost of scrap copper, although similar results were obtained from weaker definitions.
The hypothesis that the shadow price of copper inventories is not strictly convex was
strongly rejected at a greater-than  99% level of confidence. The second column tests the
same hypothesis  under the assertion  that marginal  costs are constant. Again the alternative
hypothesis  was strongly rejected.
Generally,  the estimation  results provide  strong support  for the notion  that the value
55of inventories  contains a dispersion  premium.  This finding is empirically  robust under a
variety of maintained  hypotheses  and under a variety of estimation  techniques. Further, the
model behaves  in simulation  as would  be expected  even when simulated  through periods of
rare events, including  a war and labor disputes. The existence  of a dispersion  premium is
not guaranteed by the theory developed in Section 3, so empirical tests are crucial in
explaining inventories  when a fall in price is anticipated.  The model does not strongly
support or contradict  the possibility  of Kaldor-convenience,  which could  also explain  the so-
called negative price for storage.  On the one hand, the hypothesis of jointness between
production and  inventory-holding  for US copper refiners, a  pre-condition for Kaldor-
convenience,  is generally  supported  by the model  results. However, the explanations  of the
convenience  - savings in delivery  costs, re-ordering  costs, etc.  -- imply  that inventories  are
likely to be marginally  less cost-saving  as they accumulate. In simulation,  the model did
generate some negative  marginal  values for the cost of inventory-holding;  however, those
values were not consistently associated with lower levels of  inventories.  Table 4.14
summarizes  the empirical results.
56Table 4.14: Summary  of the empirical  results.
Results relating to Kaldor-convenlence  yields:
-Jointness  between  production  and storage,  which provides  the economic  rationale  for a Kaldor-
convenience  yield is generally  supported. The result is not completely  robust  under alternative
models.
-Symmetry between marginal production and  inventory-holding  costs, an  implication of
jointness, is generally  supported,  although  the result is not completely  robust under alternative
models.
-The hypothesis  of constant  marginal  storage costs, a  feature  of cost-of-carry  models which
excludes  the possibility  of jointness, is robustly  rejected.
-In simulation,  negative  marginal  storage  costs are generated. While negative  marginal  storage
costs imply  a Kaldor-convenience,  the observations  do not appear  exclusively  when  inventories
are low, as Kaldor's theory  would  predict.
Results relating to the dispersion premium
-A dispersion  premium  will  exist if the shadow-price  function  for inventories  is strictly convex
in inventories. The alternative  hypothesis  of concavity  is strongly  rejected  with a high degree
of confidence.
-In simulation,  the dispersion  premium  for copper from 1980  to 1989  averaged  around 1.4  cents
per pound. However,  when  inventories  were low, when  strikes  appeared  imminent,  and, during
the Falkland  crisis, the premium rose.  In simulation,  the premium ranged from near zero to
about 9 cents per pound.
-The estimated  value  of the premium  as well as tests on the convexity  of the shadow  price for
copper inventories  were extremely  robust under alternative  estimation  techniques.
-Although  the model was estimated  exclusively  from data on US producers, in simulation,
larger-than-average  dispersion premiums were associated with periods of  backwardation  in
COMEX  copper futures.
-Hausman  argues that since two-stage  least-squares,  limited-information-maximum-likelihood,
and three-stage  least-squares  estimators  are all consistent,  estimation  results from the various
estimators  should be similar.  The model passes Hausman's specification  test even under a
variety  of specifications  for the price-error-variance  term.
-The test on the convexity  of the shadow  price and the existence  of a dispersion  premium  was
robust  under  a variety  of specifications  for the underlying  marginal  cost functions. Generalizing
the functional  form greatly  increased  the number  of parameters  to be estimated  and generated
a large number  of individually  insignificant  parameter  estimates. Nonetheless,  the dispersion
premium  proved relentlessly  signifiant.
-The simulated  dispersion  premiums,  as well as the tests regarding  its existence,  were robust
even when  non-jointness  or fixed  marginal  storage  costs were imposed.
575.0 Conclusion
As with many primary commodities, the price of storage for refined copper is
sometimes  negative  and copper  futures  markets  have  remained  in backwardation  for extended
periods  of time. These market  characteristics  are in direct violation  of frequently  used price-
arbitrage conditions  which maintain that storage only occurs when the price of storage is
positive.  In Section 3,  a  generalized price-arbitrage condition is developed which is
consistent with observed inventory-holding  in the face of an  anticipated fall in price.
Potentially,  there are two reasons why inventories  might be held under such circumstances.
First, the marginal  cost of storage  may indeed  be negative  at certain  low levels  of inventories
- that is, inventories  may  produce  a Kaldor-convenience  yield. In the case of copper, while
there was some evidence  that inventory-holding  are joint activities  resulting in a joint cost
function, there is little evidence  in the simulations  of a Kaldor-convenience  yield.
The second justification for inventory-holding  in backward markets stems from
uncertainty  and a convex  relationship  between  the shadow-price  of inventories  and inventory
levels.  When stock prices are low, an unanticipated  positive shift in the demand schedule
will result in rapid price gains.  While a negative  shift may be just as likely, the effect on
price is not symmetric.  This skews the distribution  of potential price outcomes toward
higher prices and generates  a dispersion  premium.
Estimates  and simulations  in Section  4 provide  strong  evidence  that the shadow  price
function  of refined copper inventories  is indeed convex in inventories. Under a variety of
assumptions,  the key parameter  in testing  for convexity  proved statistically  robust. Further,
the estimated value of the dispersion premium proved robust as well.  The premium
remained  low on average (around 1.4 cents per pound). Simulations  revealed  that the low
average premium masked the potential importance of  the  premium.  Producer-held
58inventories for the simulation  period ranged from around 25,000 to 230,000 tons.  For
inventory  levels above 80,000 tons, the dispersion  premium fell to positive but near-zero
levels in the absence of labor strife or war.  However, as inventories fell further the
premium  shot up rapidly  to a maximum  value of about nine  cents per pound. In simulation,
the dispersion  premium  also jumped  during the months  leading  up to the 1980  refiner's labor
strike and immediately  fell at the conclusion of the strike.  Similar movements  occurred
during a 1983 labor dispute and the 1982 Falkland War.  Further, the model simulated
larger dispersions  during periods of backwardation  in the copper futures market in New
York (COMEX) even though U.S. producer  prices, production,  and inventories  were used
in estimating  the model.
Just as the price of a  call option contains a premium based on the underlying
variability  of prices, the shadow  price of copper  inventories  contain  a premium  based on the
variability  of the unplanned  component  of inventories. When inventory  levels  are low, the
value of the premium increases  to the point where certain levels of inventories  will be held
even in the face of a fully anticipated  fall in price.
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64Annex 1: The Derivation of the Price-Arbitrage Condition
In this annex,  the formal  model  is presented. A generalized  price-arbitrage  condition
is derived from the first-order conditions  of the optimization  problem which is consistent
with inventory-holding  during an anticipated  price fall.  The copper-refining  problem is
characterized as a  continuous  two-cycle problem with uncertain future demand. In the
current period, the producer knows the current sales price.  By deciding how much to
produce  and sell, he determines  how much inventory  he will  bring into the next period. The
expected  marginal value, or the shadow  price, of the inventory in the next period is not
known,  but contains  a stochastic  element  since  demand  is uncertain. The effects of random
demand shocks  on the shadow  price of inventories  may be asymmetric  - that is, a positive
random shock may increase prices by more than an equally sized negative random  shock.
In such a case, the shadow price of inventory will carry a dispersion  premiurn so that the
shadow  price of inventories  increases  with the variance  of the stochastic  component  of sales.
Such a premium is analogous  to the volatility  premnium  in an options  price and can result in
positive inventory  levels even when price declines are expected.
The first-period  producer  problem can be written as:
Max,> f[ps-C(y,z)]e-'dt  + J(zl,t1)  st.  z  =  (y-s)  (Al.1)
where p  is the sales price; s  is the sales level; C is a joint cost function for storage and
production  where z  is level of inventories  3nd y is the production  level; r is the discount-
rate and J(zl,tl)  is the value of ending stocks. The cost function  is treated  jointly to allow
for a potential  cost-reducing  Kaldor-convenience  for inventories.
65The solution  can be found by solving the Hamiltonian:
Max,,H  a [ps - C(y,z)]el  + A(y-s)  (A1.2)
where the first-order  conditions  are given by:
i)  8H1.3s  - 0 - p  - A  el,  for to ststl,
U) a811o8y  - 0 - Cy - A  el',  for tostst1 ,
M) a8lH& - A  - C, - A-e, for toits: 1,  (A1.3)
fv)  A(t)  = ar/aqt),
v)  z(to)  = Zo
The producer maximizes  profits by setting  the marginal  cost of production  and the marginal
revenue  of sales epal  to the value of a marginal  change  in the level of inventories  at the end
of the first period - that is, the shadow  price of inventories  at time tS (from conditions  i,
ii and iv in Al.3, evaluated  at t,).  Evaluating  the solution  at t, - O, p - C, X A  *  ai/8.
Prices are known in the current period, and inventory levels are determined  once
sales and production levels are decided, but the ending  value of inventories  is not known
exactly. Rather, the value of stocks J, and the shadow price of inventories, X, are based
on expectations  about future prices, production,  and sales.
When sales contain  a random element, inventory  levels will also be stochastic  and
changes in inventories  will contain a planned and unplanned  component. The difference
between  planned  and actual inventories  will be the difference  between  expected  and actual
production  minus sales.  For the moment, assume that the change in inventories  can be
expressed  as the following  process:
66;-Ztl  - E,-1[zt;-Z-]  - et  = ;-;-I  - Et d[yt-sg]  (A1.4)
where e  has an expected value of zero and a variance o2.  Rewriting the constraint on
inventories in continuous-time  notation, the value of ending inventories  at time t,  is the
solution  to the following  infinite-horizon  problem:
e Max, Ef{tps  - C(y,z)]e"K}dt.  51  A  - E(y-s)t*  + adv.  5)
The term dv  u(t)dt 1 1 2 is a Wiener process, where u(t) -N(O,1).  Because inventory
changes  include  a random  component, dz/dt  does not exist in the usual sense and the  laes
of stochastic  calculus apply.
Evaluated at t,,  the solution to A1.5 gives the value of ending stocks, that is,
J(.zt 1 ) - V(zl)e  '.  In the language of optimal  control theory, the firm's problem is a
stochastic infinite-horizon  problem, stretching from t, onwards.  As a result, the shadow
price for the end-of-period  inventories  in the first stage of the producer  problemn  is based on
expectations  of an on-going  process of production  amid uncertain  demand. Generally, the
solution for J(zl,tl)  can be found by solving Bellman's equation, a partial differential
equation: -aJ(zj,tr)1&8 = rV(z1)e"'.  Arbitrarily setting tO  -0  simplifies the equation
somewhat  so that the solution  to the inventory  problem from t1 onward can be represented
by the Hamilton-Jacobi  equation of dynamic  programming:
rV(z 1)  = Max,,E [Ps - C(y,z)  + VZ(y-s)  +  V(A1.6
The first-order conditions  for the maximization  of A1.6 are:
67i) E(p  - VS) . 0
a)  E(-Cy + V.) - 0  (A.7)
L)  E(A)  - E(y-S)dt
tv) z(t 1 0)  - Zi
The producer solves  for planned  production,  sale  and inventories  by setting
expected  marginal  costs  equal  to expected  pnce equal  to the dsdow price  of inventories,  V,
- which is itself an expected  value.
It is worth noting that the distribution  of the error term, especially  a2,  is
independent  of the decision  variables. The variance  of the error is regarded  as a state  of
nature  and  is not subject  to choice  on the part of the producer. This  assumption  is implicit
thoughout the paper and works well  empirically. Further,  the derivation  of stochastic
differenial  equations  are premised  on the fact that  the distribution  is dependent  solely  on
rraet-period  information  (see, for example,  Malliaris nd Brock,  1982,  p. 67, or Merton,
1992,  p. 67). The  distinction  is a subtle  one, since  it is reasonable  to think  of the variance
as some  function  of demand  or supply. However,  in terms  of the optimization  problem,  it
is the expected  value  of the function,  not the function  itself,  that  is relevant.
Several additional  asuumptions  must be made to guarantee  that the first-order
conditions  do indoed  provide  a maxinmu. V must  be concave  in z; the solution  values  of
z, y, ad  s must be positivel  (otherwise  border  solutions  must be considered);  and the
' For the  empirical  pblem  at had,  refner ientories  of refined  copper re all  positive  u are
quaties  sold  d produced. Inventories  at both the COMEX  ad  LME have  remained  postive
thzoughout  the  bsty  of thou insditutios  well. However,  to be complete,  stock-outs  need  to be
onsidered  in the thoretical model  ad  non-negativity  consorints  intoduced  to the moximizaon
problem.  Thee are  given  in Anex 2.
68transversality-at-infinity  condition  must hold. 2
An expression for the marginal value of  inventories is found by applying the
envelope  theory (Lopez, 1989)  to the Hamilton-Jacobi  equation  given in Al.6:
rVg - E-C,  + V,(y -S) +  .!V  21.  (A1.8)
At the solution, Etp]  - Vz, (as part of the first-order  conditions  in A1.7) so that:
EBdpetkJ - V1[*k/d*j  (Al.9)
Rewriting  part iii of A1.7 provides E[dz/dkJ - Ely-asl.  These results can be combined  to
form a price-arbitrage  condition. First, from rearranging  A1.8 and using iii from Al.7:
V,xELy-sl  = VYE[dzdd  - rV,  + E[C3J - V,c,a.  (A1l.O)
Combining  Al. 10 with A1.9 provides:
Edpl/d]  - rE[p]  + E[C,]  - 1 V02,  for  z,a,y  > 0  (Al.ll) 2
Equation Al.11  is a  generalization  of price-arbitrage conditions given in cost-of-carry
models  such as Williams  and Wright (1991, p. 27).  The arbitrge  condition  states that the
2For  the infinite-horizon  autonomous  problem  given  above,  the tverslity  condition  is:
lrm V,(t)Z(t)#  *  liin  JS(t)Z(t)rf  - 0.
Benveniste  and Schnkmn  (1982)  owed that the condition  is necoy  mid  sffiient  for the
solution  of A1  .6 to be opdmal.  he logic  is that  any posidve  sock level  g hve no value  a  the
problem  apoaes  infinity. Otherwe, the firm  could  furhe  Ices  proft  by either  producing
less  or selling  more  in the last  period. Invene  have  value  beuse,  uldtmay, twy can  be sold.
If some  price  exists  at which  no  copper  can  be sold,  thm  me  upper  bound  mu  eist for  the  uhdow
price of inventories.  If so and if sock levels, z,  re limited  by pysic  sore  or naural
endowmu,  then  dioun  wil assure  that  the laaverality condition  holds. See  Brock  (1987)
for ftrther detils on the geal  condition.
69expected  change  in price will  be equal to rE[pl  -- interest  on investing  the money  elsewhere
plus C, - the costs of physical  storage  and any amenity  from storage  -- minus 2 V=  02.
If V= is positive, then this last term constitutes  a dispersion premium that increases with
the variability of the stochastic  component  of inventories  02.  The last two components  of
Al.11  have important implications  for holding inventories in the face of less-than-full
carrying charges.  According  to the condition, it still may be optimal  to hold inventories
when the market is in backwardation  - E[dplb]  < 0  --  if inventories  provide a cost-
reducing Kaldor-convenience  (that is, if C, is sufficiently  negative)  and/or the dispersion
premium, 2 Vo 2 , is sufficiently  positive. The two components  are not mutually  dependent.
Kaldor-convenience  alone can potentially  explain inventory-holding  in backward  markets,
as can a dispersion  premium. When V,  = 0 and C. is positive, Al. 11 reduces  to the cost-
of-carry price-arbitrage  condition.
For the cost-of-carry  model, no inventories are held when the sum of the current
price plus a constant physical storage cost is greater than the expected discounted  future
price.  Putting  this constraint  into a continuous-tirne  counter-part:
E[d,pldt]  = rpk  jb  fr  z  > 0  (A1.12)
The two arbitrage conditions  differ in two respects.  In Al.12,  storage costs are
treated as a constant positive  marginal  cost, and separate  from other activities  such as sales
or production.  Cost-of-carry  models are usually based on the activities of professional
speculators  who presumably  receive no convenience  from holding inventories  and do not
participate  in production. Generally,  however,  there is nothing  fundamental  to the derivation
of cost-of-carry models which requires fixed marginal storage costs and the marginal
storage-cost  function could be written in a more flexible  manner.  The second difference
70between the two arbitrage conditions is the presence of a dispersion premium in  the
generalized  price-arbitrage  conditions. This comes  from treating  the value of the inventories
as stochastic.  Cost-of-carry  models use expected prices (or futures prices representing
expected  prices) but do not treat the price changes  themselves  as a stochastic  process. This
differs from option-pricing  models where the variance of the underlying  commodity  price
enters explicitly into the evaluation  of the option.
The dispersion premium, 2 Va 2,  can be interpreted as the expected  difference
between the stochastic  and deterministic  value of inventories. To see this, start with the
marginal-value  function of inventories defined in  terms of a  detemiinistic component
(planned  inventories)  plus a random  element, and calculate  a Taylor-series  approximation:
VZ(zd+e) s  VZ(Zd) +  Vege  +  V  +  6  (A1.13)
When  e  has  an  expected value  of  zero,  and  is  symmetrically distributed, where
E[e]  = E[e 3j  = 0 and  E[e21  =  o2,  the  expected difference  between the stochastic and
determiniktic  component  of the shadow  price for inventories  is approximately  the dispersion
premium:
E|Vz+[  V(zd)]  0  I V  2,  (A1.14)
Even when demand  and inventories  are treated  as stochastic,  there is nothing  in the
first or second-order  maximiza.on conditions  that would require  V= to be positive.  In
fact, V could  certainly be quadratic  in z so that V= need not exist. However, in much of
the literature on inventories  the shadow  price of inventories  is often described  as convex in
71z - at least implicitly. 3 Usually it is stated that there is some type of "pipeline"  minimum
stock level (Figure A1.2).  As stock-levels  are drawn down and approach  pipeline levels,
larger and larger price increases  are required to deplete  diminished  inventories. Usually  the
convexity  is attributed  to a convenience  yield.  According  to this argument, pipeline levels
are required to carry out business in an orderly fashion, while additional  stocks, up to a
point, can still facilitate transactions or minimize costs such as re-orders, deliveries, or
restocking.
As it turns out, V= will exists if either of the marginal  cost functions,  Cs, the cost
of physical storage, or C,,, the cost of production, are nonlinear. This is true whether  or
not the cost function  is joint or whether  stocks are cost-reducing  at any level.  To see this,
recall that E[p]  = E[C,J  =  V. from the first-order  conditions  (Al.7) and that:
d2p  = V  Z 2 = d2C,  (A1.lS)
From equation A1.15 it is easy to see that if the joint cost function is linear or
quadratic  in z and y so that d2C. is z. ro, then V= = E[d 2p/dz 2l  will always equal zero.
Earlier it was stated that stochastic  demand  will give rise to stochastic  inventories;
however, little was said about  the relationship  between  the means and variances  of the two
distributions. As it turns out, the problem can be cast in terms of either stochastic  demand
or stochastic  price.  This result comes from the finance literature (for example, Cootner,
1964, and especially  Merton, 1992). There is long history of decomposing  inventories  into
expected and random components (planned and unplanned inventories), particularly in
Keynesian  macroeconomics. Stochastic  prices are often employed in finance and capital
3For  example,  Working  (1948),  p. 19  and Brennan  (1958),  p. 54.
72literature  (for example, Black  and Scholes, 1973, or Abel, 1983).
For the formal model, the only distinction  between the two concepts involves a
normalization  of the  stochastic difference equation, which constrains the optimization
problem. This result is due to Merton (1992, pp. 57-75). Consider first the process:
v(t)  r  X(k)-X(k-I)-Ek_{X(k)-X(k-I)),  k=l,...n  (A1.16)
where k denotes  observed values, so that the partial sums Sn1 ?jv(k)  form a martingale.
Now  let  F(t)  =f(X,t),  where  f  is  some non-linear function.  Merton shows that
F(k)-F(k-1)  will give rise to  essentially the same stochastic difference equation as
X(k)  - X(k-1).  This  result is used frequently in finance literature  -- for  example,  when
valuing  instruments  such as warrants in terms of the variance  of the underlying  stock price.
For the problem  at hand, the result is useful sinrce  it allows the differential equation
associated  with the optimization  problem to be expressed  either in terms of stochastic  sales
or stochastic  price.  Empirically,  it turns out to be convenient  to treat price as stochastic
since  there is an explicit  first-order  condition  from which the price-expectation  error can be
estimated.
Returning  to the copper-inventory  problem,  when sales are treated as stochastic  then
z=  z,_  l  y[p(s)]  - s.  Utilizing Merton's  result, the stochastic differential equation can be
written as:
dz  = E(y-s)dt  +  (yPpP-l)QS(t)u8(t)dt112 (A1.17)
When  the  demand  equation  is  inverted  and  price  is  treated  as  stochastic,
Zt  =  *y(p)  +  s(p)  and the associated  stochastic  differential  equation can be written as:
Either equation  A1.  17 or AI. 18 can be normalized  to yield a version similar  to the constaint
73dZ = E(y-s)dt  + (yp _SP)aO(,)uP(,)d,112  (Al.18)
in A1.5:
dz = E(y-s)dt  + oa(t)u(t)dt112. (A1.19)
In the next section, estimation  results are presented  based on monthly  data for US
copper  refiners.  After  calculating  the  money  return  to  storage,
m(t)  a p(t)-p(t-l)-r(t-l)p(t-l),  the following  two equations  are estimated  jointly:
I"(t)  - C,(t) -.  P 2 2(t)  + U,(t)
2  (A1.20)
p(t)  = C(t)  + u(t)
The first equation in A1.20 is a discrete version of the price-arbitrage  condition
given in Al.11 plus an error term u.  The second equatiou is a combination  of i and ii
from the first-order conditions  given in Al.7  plus an error term up.  Merton's result is
especially  handy in this application,  since the second  of the two equations  provides  a formal
model for u,  the stochastic  component  of price.  By using instruments,  consistent  (in the
econometric sense) estimated values of  up can then be used to form a  logically self-
consistent estimate of  a2.  As noted earlier, expressing the constraint in terms of the
unanticipated  component  of price rather than sales or inventories  is essentially  a simple re-
scaling  of the constraint. The symbol P.  is therefore  used to reflect the re-scaled value  of
V..  The term P.  is treated as a constant  and estimated  directly as a parameter. This
treatment is equivalent to assuning that the underlying marginal cost function can be
reasonably  approximated  by a quadratic.'
'Recall  equation  3.15.
74These results are employed in Section 4 of this paper to test for convexity in the
shadow  price for copper  and provide  an estimate  of the dispersion  premium  associated  with
copper inventories.  In addition, the model can also provide a test of jointness between
production and inventory holding, which forms the ecomonic rationale for  a Kaldor-
convenience  benefit.
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In order to test whether the results rqorted  above are dependent  on the functional
form chosen, a more general form, quadratic with third-order terms for z and y,  was
estimated. Specifically,  the following  marginal  cost functions  were substituted  for 4.2:
C,bo+  XiS  b X,  +S  SEbVXj  +b,
I  b  I  (A3.1)
C,  . co  + E  £Xx  +  Ec 79
1  1  1
where Xi, for  i =  1,2,...,5 represents  inventories  (z), production  (y), the price of electricity
(x), the price of scrap copper  (w), and refining  capacity  (f).  The estimation  procedure was
repeated  on:
S  5  5
i(t)  m  bo  +  E  biyxl  +  E  E  b"XX,  +  bk(t)  +  b7*  - Xt  +  d (t)
1  1  (A3.2)
P(t)  "Co +  ClX +  Z  CUX,X  +  C.k(t)  +  C7 4 dt(t)
1  110t
using the three estimation  techniques  and the six specifications  of 0;(t).  Paameters from
one of the eighteen  estimations,  where a six-month  moving average was used to calculate
6 (t),  are given in Table A3.  1.  The parameters were estimated  using three-stage  least-
squares.
77Tabb  A3.1:  Paameter  estimdons  for tbe quadratic-plus  model.
Parameter  Estimate  t-score  Parmmeter  Estinate  t-score
CZ O  0.72  0.16  CY O  -0.82  -0.17
CZ Z  -I.OOE-02  -1.45  CY Z  0.93E-02  1.36
CZ Y  *0.03  -2.06'  CY_Y  -0.02  -1.05
CZ X  51.69  0.33  CY X  13.09  0.08
CZ W  -7.05  -2.44'  CY W  7.89  2.97'
CZF  0.24E-02  3.10'  CY_F  -0.34E-03  -0.40
CZ ZZ  4.39E-04  -1.92*  CY ZZ  0.401-05  0.82
CZ ZY  -0.58E405  -0.39  CY7ZY  -L.OOE-05  40.67
CZ ZX  0.27  2.50*  CY_ZX  *0.22  -2.24*
CZ ZW  1.001-03  0.47  CY ZW  -O.IIE-02  *0.43
CZ77P  O.JOE-05  1.44  CY ZF  0.12E-05  1.47
CZ YY  0.57E-05  0.48  CY_YY  0.48E-04  0.34
CZ YX  0.48  2.03*  CY-YX  0.17  0.54
cZ YW  0.02  2.83*  CY YW  -0.54E402  -0.85
CZ YF  -0.48E46  -0.20  CYYF  0.48145  1.72*
CZ XX  4120.33  -0.69  CY7XX  66.20  0.06
CZ XW  93.13  1.96*  CY_XW  -98.85  -2.32'
CZ XF  40.05  -3.36*  CYXF  0.01  0.86
CZ WW  1.12  1.62  CYWW  -0.21  -0.33
CZ7WF  -0.50E43  -1.68*  CY WF  -0.43E-03  -1.37
CZ FF  0.52E07  0.51  CY_FF  -0.16E-06  -2.12*
CZZZZ  0.84-07  1.77*  CYYYY  -0.16E-06  -0.41
C5ZK  0 10  3.00*  CY K  0.01  0.31
v-ZZZ  6.57  2.43*
Note: T-scorms  markod  with  an *  ar  sinifiant at a 90%  +  level  of confidence.  The parameters  are
named  using the  folowing convention:  CZ_W is the  parameter  in the marginal  cost of storale function
(C.) on w, CY_WF  is the parmmeter  in the marginal  cost of production  function (C,) on the product  of
w and  f, CZ ZZZ is the coefficie.nt  in C, on z', where  z  is inventories,  y is producdon, x is the price of
elctricity,  w is the price of scrap copper, f is refining  capacity,  and k is the strike dummy.  V ZZZ is
the coefficient  on the six-month  moving  varince, - 2(t).
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